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Abstract 
In 2008, the Central Bank of Ghana launched the first ever 
biometric money, e-zwich, in hopes of promoting branchless 
banking and financial inclusion. Despite been hailed as an 
innovative policy aimed at transforming the financial 
industry of the country e-zwich has yet to realize its full 
potential. A number of studies has been conducted to 
highlight the many challenges the system faces. This study 
was also aimed at seeking an explanation to the relative 
ineffectiveness or failures of e-zwich system but through a 
theoretical framework. Using Rogers' (2003) framework on 
the characteristics of innovation, the study seeks to 
explain why the e-zwich system continues to face 
significant challenges despite several attempts that have 
been initiated to help revamp it. Rogers argues that the 
decision to adopt innovation depends on the innovation's 
relative advantages, compatibility, complexity, 
trialability and observability and in essence, the success 
of the innovation dwells on these characteristics. 
Therefore, the study attempts to investigate if e-zwich as 
an innovation exhibited these characteristics prior to it 
been adopted by the Central Bank. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
With the advent of computers and electronic 
communications a large number of alternative electronic 
payment systems has emerged. An electronic payment system 
is any system used to settle financial transactions through 
the transfer of monetary value, and includes the 
institutions, instruments, people, rules, procedures, 
standards, and technologies that make such an exchange 
possible ("Types of E Payment", n.d.). In other words, 
electronic payment is a form of financial exchange that 
occurs between the buyer and seller facilitated by means of 
electronic communication (Kumaga, 2010; See also Vassiliou, 
2004) . Payment systems are used instead of tendering cash 
in domestic and international transactions and is an 
important service provided by banks and other financial 
institutions in modern banking. There are not many 
inventions that have transformed the business of banking as 
quickly as the e-banking revolution (Nitsure, 2003). World 
over, banks are reorienting their business strategies 
towards new opportunities offered by e-banking. 
E-banking, employing either offline or online 
technologies, has enabled banks to scale borders, change 
strategic behavior and thus bring about new possibilities. 
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Even in countries with less developed banking systems, E-
banking has offered many new business opportunities. 
Electronic banking has been around for quite some time in 
the form of automatic teller machines (ATMs) and telephone 
transactions (Nitsure, 2003). In more recent times, it has 
been transformed by the internet, enabling both banks and 
customers to undertake numerous and varied transactions 
within a short period of time. Thus for customers, the 
internet offers faster access, is more convenient and 
available around the clock regardless of the customer's 
location. For banks, it provides a much more efficient and 
cost- effective avenue (Nitsure, 2003). 
There are varieties of electronic payment. Credit 
cards, debit cards and prepaid cards currently represent 
the most common form of electronic payments ("Types of E-
Payment", n.d.). For all three types of cards the consumer 
or the business most often uses a plastic card, commonly 
with a magnetic stripe. The cardholder gives his or her 
card or card number to a merchant who swipes the card 
through a terminal or enters the data to a PC. The terminal 
transmits data to his or her bank, the appropriator. The 
appropriator in turn transmits the data through a card 
association to the card issuer who makes a decision on the 
transaction and relays it back to the merchant, who gives 
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goods or services to the cardholder. Funds flow later for 
settlement with credit cards and are debited immediately 
for debit or credit cards. Along with magnetic stripe 
cards, smart cards are and will increasingly be used for 
payments. Smart cards are at present overwhelmingly plastic 
credit cards with an embedded computer chip. Hitherto, many 
smart cards operated using proprietary rather than common 
standards. A standard set of specifications, Europay-
MasterCard-Visa (EMV), has been developed and is being used 
increasingly so that the chips on smart cards are 
interoperable. Korea and Japan are among the most advanced 
countries in Asia for smart card payments, with Malaysia 
catching up fast due to government mandates for banks to 
issue smart cards ("Types of E-Payment", n.d.). 
Online payments involve the customer transferring 
money or making a purchase online via the internet. 
Consumers and businesses can transfer money to third 
parties from the bank or other account, and they can also 
use credit, debit and prepaid cards to make purchases 
online. Current estimates indicate that over 80% of 
payments for online purchases are undertaken using a credit 
card or debit card ("Types of E-Payment", n.d.). At 
present, most online transactions involve payment with a 
credit card. While other forms of payment such as direct 
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debits to accounts or pre-paid accounts and cards are on 
the rise, they currently represent a less developed 
transaction methodology. ("Types of E-Payment", n.d.). VISA 
is the most popularly used debit card in Ghana although 
some of the banks have their own proprietary debit cards 
(Kumaga, 2010). Debit cards are used to withdraw cash from 
automated teller machine (ATMs) and to make payment of 
purchases by using point of sale (POS) outlets. It is 
important to note that very few departmental stores and 
restaurants have established POS machines to perform 
transactions through debit cards. 
Another electronic payment that is gradually gaining 
grounds is mobile payment. Mobile phones are currently used 
for a limited number of electronic transactions. Consumers 
can use their mobile phone to pay for transactions in 
several ways. Consumers may send an SMS message, transmit a 
PIN number, and use Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) to 
make online payments, or perform other segments of their 
transaction with the phone. As phones develop further, 
consumers are likely to be able to use infrared, Bluetooth 
and other means more frequently to transmit full account 
data in order to make payments securely and easily from 
their phone. Additionally, merchants can obtain an 
authorization for a credit or debit card transaction by 
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attaching a device to their mobile phone. A consortium in 
the US also recently announced PowerSwipe, for example, 
which physically connects to a Nextel phone, weighs 3.1 
ounces, and incorporates a magnetic stripe reader, infrared 
printing port, and pass-through connector for charging the 
handset battery ("Types of E-Payment", n.d.). In the 
developing world, mobile payment is not being lost on them 
although mobile transactions are not as sophisticated as 
that indicated above and there are certain challenges. 
With the rate of mobile phone subscription increasing 
by the day, banks in Africa are taking advantage of this 
opportunity to encourage mobile banking. Bank customers can 
check their account balance, transfer funds to other 
accounts among a host of others without having to go to the 
banks directly. On a continent where mobile phone use is 
popular even among illiterates, it is a good opportunity to 
include the uneducated folk into the banking system. As of 
2014, it was predicted that internet use on mobile phones 
in Africa will increase twenty-fold in the next five years. 
(Smith, 2014). This increase, the researchers claim will be 
twice the rate of growth in the rest of the world. Thus the 
future of electronic payment on the continent is promising. 
As Fredrik Jejdling, sub-Saharan Africa head of Swedish 
tech company, Ericsson, remarked, "The large number of 
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people in sub-Saharan Africa who do not have bank accounts 
suggests that mobile phones may be the only way that many 
people will be able to access financial services" (Smith, 
2014). In Ghana for example, almost all the major 
telecommunications companies have some sort of mobile money 
transactions that customers can subscribe to or it can be 
just a one-time transaction. The biggest telecommunication 
company in the country, MTN Ghana for instance, has the 
Mjara Loans in which subscribers can borrow money and repay 
over a certain period, all through the phone. 
In Ghana, people are hesitant to receive payment 
through electronic medium due to lack of proper education 
about e-payment. Similarly in Kenya, Google has teamed up 
with Equity Bank, the largest bank in East Africa, to 
launch a payment card which lets users pay for their bus 
fare via Near Field Communications (NFC) . This payment 
system, known as BebaPay (similar to Google Wallet) allows 
customers to tap or swipe the prepaid card against a card 
reader when boarding a bus to pay for their journey. The 
BebaPay service is now available on buses in Nairobi and a 
free app enables any Android NFC phone to be used as a card 
reader. Shops, traders and small businesses will be able to 
use Google's BebaPay in the future to accept payments from 
customers, without having expensive tills and cash 
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registers." (Boden, 2013). This system is based on the 
Google Wallet concept that allows its users to store debit 
cards, credit cards, loyalty cards, and gift cards among 
other things, as well as redeeming sales promotions on 
their mobile phone. Google Wallet is already being used by 
transit commuters in New Jersey to pay for tickets, but its 
usage is limited to certain kinds of smartphones. 
Thus, albeit cash is yet to disappear from everyday 
life, the world's largest information technology and 
financial companies are working on ways to completely 
replace it with wireless communication payments to be made 
from smartphones. And some companies such as IBM want to 
take it a step further and link those wireless payments to 
biometric signatures to prevent individual accounts from 
ever being a victim of identity theft (Gomez, 2015) 
Biometric payment is the newest form of electronic 
payment system. It is believed that in the near future, 
financial services providers might roll out a cashless 
system based on the digital wallet concept, or one with an 
additional level of security using biometrics that would 
extend beyond smartphones (Gomez, 2015). Electronic 
payments using biometrics are still largely in their 
infancy. Trials are underway in the United States, 
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Australia and a limited number of other countries. Most 
biometric payments involve using fingerprints as the 
identification and access tool. However, companies like 
Visa International are piloting more sophisticated 
techniques such as voice recognition technology and retina 
scans. Essentially, a biometric identifier such as a 
fingerprint or voice could replace the plastic card and 
more securely identify the person performing the 
transaction. The electronic payment is still charged to a 
credit card or other account, with the biometric identifier 
replacing the card, check or other transaction mechanism. 
IBM believes that in the near future, people will be 
scanning their eyes to withdraw money from the ATM, for 
example, and access accounts. And whether we appreciate the 
idea or not, IBM's research suggests that this is a 
technological trend that is finally on the move in the 
United States. Biometric payment system is gradually 
gaining grounds in the developing world as well. South 
Africa was the first country in Sub-Saharan Africa to have 
employed biometric technology. Due to the increasing access 
and use of the internet, people associate e-banking with 
only internet banking. It needs to be noted that e-banking 
and for that matter biometric technology, can apply to both 
offline, online and internet banking. By the end of 2009, 
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besides Ghana and Nigeria, the South African firm, Netl 
Universal Electronic 
Payment System (UEPS) had delivered large biometric 
payment systems in Namibia, Botswana, Malawi and Iraq 
(Breckenridge, 2005; 2008). The biometric payment systems 
in these countries have the advantage of performing both 
offline and online transactions. In Ghana and Nigeria 
however, biometric technology was first employed to provide 
universal identity registration of citizens before later 
efforts were made to target people who might use the banks. 
In South Africa, the system was used to transfer social 
grants. Since the end of the 1990s the founder of Netl 
UEPS, Serge Belamant, has been working tirelessly to build 
an alternative to the Europay-Mastercard-Visa (EMV) 
standard, geared particularly to the needs of the third-
world poor and using a patented biometric system of 
authentication (Breckenridge, 2010). SmartSwitch Nigeria 
Limited and Smartswitch Namibia are the Nigerian and 
Namibian subsidiaries of Net 1 UEPS Technologies Inc. 
respectively. SmartSwitch was established to deploy the 
Netl patented Universal Electronic Payment System (UEPS) 
technology which provides a secure, universal and 
affordable e-purse, multi-application, multi-wallet and 
multi-issuer switching and settlement system, catering for 
9 
10 
both the financial and non-financial market sectors. 
Similar to the Nigerian system is Ghana's e-zwich biometric 
payment system. 
Some of the benefits cited by advocates of this system 
in both countries were that they are safe and secure, 
easily accessible, and extremely affordable. In India, the 
state of Andhra Pradesh initiated the oldest biometric 
system in the country and like in South Africa, the 
project's main aim was to provide electronic benefit 
transfers to rural folks. The first Iraqi UEPS transaction 
was performed on August 3, 2008, in Baghdad, during the 
launch of the UEPS smart card technology with two Iraqi 
state banks, Rafidain Bank and Rasheed Bank ("Smart Card 
Payment System Launched in Iraq", 2012). Consumers are 
issued with biometric UEPS smart cards, so that they can 
have welfare payments and other fund transfers loaded onto 
their cards. They can then use the cards for purchases at 
POS terminals, authenticating themselves either with a PIN 
or at a fingerprint reader. A pilot project involving 
100,000 beneficiaries was implemented across selected Iraqi 
bank branches. The pilot was for the distribution and 
payment of government grants to war victims and martyrdom 
beneficiaries, as well as salary and wage distribution and 
payment to employees of the two state banks. 
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So electronic payments are well received by 
policymakers in both developed and developing countries, 
however in the latter, the initiative is taken up by the 
state or local governments or a private-public partnership 
while in the developed world, private firms are leading the 
way. This reception to electronic payment is necessitated 
by the benefits that the system brings to both individuals 
and national governments. Promoting a cashless society is 
beneficial for so many reasons. The technology being used 
to usher in a cashless age has the potential to off er 
security benefits to its users. It is very easy to shut 
down a digital wallet remotely if it falls into the wrong 
hands and biometric ID is specific to only one person, and 
therefore very hard to copy. Some major economic benefits 
of EPS include mobilizing savings and ensuring most of the 
cash available in the country are with the banks (Kumaga, 
2010) . This will in turn make funds available to borrowers 
(businesses and individuals). A country's payment system 
facilitates trade and exchange and these transactions 
generate a derived demand for payment instruments 
(Humphrey, Kim & Vale, 2001). The cost of making payments 
can account for 3 percent of Gross Domestic Product; Since 
an electronic payment often only costs from one-third to 
one-half as much as a paper-based transaction (a check or 
paper giro) , significant social benefits can be made by 
promoting the use of electronic (Humphrey, Kim & Vale, 
2001). 
Despite the technological advancements in electronic 
commerce, electronic payment systems via smart cards, 
credit and debit cards have definite disadvantages (Phelan 
III. & Phelan, 2007). On a much grander scale, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to predict how a cashless 
financial system would work. Consumers may expose 
themselves to unnecessary inconvenience and complications, 
which are more likely in the early stages of any new 
technology. This problem would be particularly profound in 
developing countries as witnessed in Ghana, Nigeria, and 
India among others. In India for instance, Mukhopadhyay, 
Muralidharan, Niehaus & Sukhtankar (2013) noted that: 
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delays in the provision of transaction- level authentication data by 
banks have made it difficult for the government of Andhrah Pradesh 
(GoAP) to monitor the prevalence of manual override-enabled carded 
payments. The persistence of non-authenticated payments, in combination 
with the lack of de-duplication protocol, implies that not all 
loopholes for leakage have been closed. 
However, Gelb and Decker (2007) believe that biometric 
technologies have improved and become ubiquitous enough to 
allow the confident identification and low cost needed to 
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implement successful cash-transfer programs in developing 
countries. Furthermore, the greater sense of security 
associated with electronic payments as against traditional 
payment is also doubted by some people. Google, for example 
swears that the Google Wallet system is more secure than 
cash and credit cards, but just recently it had to do a 
temporary shutdown of a feature that allows users to load 
prepaid card information onto smartphones for spending. The 
reason for the shutdown was due to a security vulnerability 
that was exposed by a researcher at a technology convention 
(Gomez, 2015). 
Another potential problem is the failure rate of 
biometric ID systems. These systems may be convenient, but 
they are far from perfect. One report states that if you 
research "failure rate of biometric data systems" via a 
search engine or academic database, you will find some 
demoralizing information about the system ("Types of E-
Payment", n.d.). For instance, a test by the National 
Physical Laboratory's Centre for Mathematics and Scientific 
Computing in the UK, found that the failure to enroll rate 
of the fingerprint biometric system is 1%. This means some 
people might not even be able to enroll in a biometric 
system using their fingerprints. Hence, the greater the 
population, the higher the failure rate. So even though 1% 
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may seem like a small figure, it can actually be 
significant. If there are hundred million individuals 
wanting to use a biometric system to safeguard their 
digital wallets, a failure to enroll rate of 1%, means one 
million people would not be able to even use the system. In 
Ghana for example, so many individuals complained that they 
were not able to perform their transactions because the POS 
terminals were not able to recognize their fingerprints. 
Issues such as this cast a doubt on whether biometrics are 
as reliable as their sales and marketing pitches, 
policymakers and advocates portray them to be. 
Practically speaking, debit transaction (which is a 
feature of biometric payment system) is currently available 
in the physical world only, not the internet. A number of 
financial institutions have introduced technology that 
could advance the development of PIN-based debit processing 
on the web, including digital certificates, smartcard 
solutions and compact disc-based systems. But no widely-
accepted operating standards have yet to be established 
("Online vs. Offline Debit Transactions", 2002). 
Nevertheless, it is only a matter of time that biometric 
payment systems as found in these developing countries and 
elsewhere would incorporate suitable internet technology, 
taking e-banking to another level. 
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However, on the basis of United Nations report on e-
banking in developed countries, United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2002 report has 
identified four challenges that developing countries, in 
general, are expected to overcome to achieve the benefits 
that e-banking initiatives can bring about (Nitsure, 2003). 
First, the ability to adopt global technology to local 
requirements. As the report goes on to say, there has to be 
an adequate level of infrastructure and human capacity 
building before developing countries can adopt the global 
technology for their local requirement. A lot of corporate 
companies and consumers in some developing countries either 
do not trust or do not have access to the necessary 
infrastructure to be able to process e-payment. Second, the 
capability to strengthen public support for e-finance. 
Historically, most e-finance initiatives in developing 
countries have been the result of cooperative partnership 
between the private and public sectors. As a result, if the 
public sector does not have the required capacity to 
initiate and implement the projects, it is important that 
cooperative efforts between public and private sectors, 
along with the multilateral agencies like the World Bank, 
be developed to facilitate public support for e-finance 
related initiatives. 
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Third, the ability to create a necessary level of 
regulatory and institutional frameworks: The lack of 
regulatory frameworks, trust, security and privacy 
standards, high trade barriers, customer and investor 
protections impede progress in implementing e-banking 
initiatives on a larger scale in many developing countries. 
Last but not least, the ability to mainstream small and 
medium scale enterprises (SMEs) towards e-banking: The 
availability of and access to quality data and banking 
information is required for SMEs in developing countries to 
move towards e-banking. Similarly, on-line credit 
information will enhance SME's ability to secure financing. 
Aside these challenges, policies initiated in developing 
countries are often polarized among political lines as the 
incumbent governments always try to tie the success of any 
policy to its managerial prowess. As a result, any failure, 
is quickly attributed to incompetence on the part of the 
sitting government and its national party by opposition 
parties. Opposition parties are therefore quick to oppose 
any initiative implemented by the incumbent government 
regardless of the benefits of the policy. Even more 
problematic is the possibility of a new regime abandoning 
sound projects initiated by the previous regime. This 
problem obviously affects the sustainability and support of 
any prior policies initiated by the previous. So many 
projects are many a time, inadequately funded rendering 
them ineffective. 
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The UNCTAD 2002 report could not have been any more 
accurate. These are real challenges that confront most 
developing countries in their effort to catch up to the 
rest of the world with regard to e-banking. As a result, 
biometric payment systems delivered in the above mentioned 
countries have faced similar challenges identified in the 
report. In India (where the poverty ratio is still adverse 
at 26.1 per cent of total population), it is likely that 
wealthier people will rapidly migrate to e-banking 
platforms leaving the poor to bear the cost of the physical 
infrastructure of branches in the form of transaction fees 
or non-competitive interest rates on their deposits 
(Nitsure, 2003). Likewise in Ghana, systems of biometric 
identification that was initially meant to provide 
universal identity registration was obscured by the effort 
to target people who might use the banks (Breckenridge, 
2010). 
The value of this research therefore is to investigate 
certain characteristics that favor the adoption of global 
or foreign policies by local economies. It attempts to do 
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so by emphasizing Ghana's biometric payment system, the e-
zwich and seeks to understand the various reasons that 
could explain the relative failure or ineffectiveness of 
the policy. Rogers (2003) argues that innovations offering 
more relative advantage, compatibility, simplicity, 
trialability, and observability will be adopted faster than 
other innovations. Using Rogers' framework, thi~ study 
seeks to investigate if the e-zwich policy exhibited these 
features prior to it been adopted by the Central Bank of 
Ghana. 
Fig 1. The E-zwich card. 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW ON APPROACHES TO STUDYING 
POLICY 
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Rogers' diffusion of innovation theory set the 
pace for increased scholarly work on policy diffusion. 
While his emphasis was on the role of 'people' in the 
adoption of an innovation, recent work has focused on the 
various processes involved in policy diffusion. This 
section of the study, aside looking at the various 
diffusion mechanisms existing in the literature, also 
discusses other equally important approaches to studying 
policy adoption or diffusion. Rogers' theory of innovation 
is also examined without going into its nitty-gritties and 
an attempt is made to justify why this particular theory 
was deployed at the expense of other approaches to studying 
policy adoption and particularly, for the case studies 
presented here. For brevity purposes the study only looks 
at a handful of alternative theories on how policies are 
adopted and implemented by policymakers in a social system. 
They are pluralism, regime theory, and institutionalism. 
These theories are examined because they have attracted 
substantial scholarly work, with authors positing variants 
of each theory while attracting equally significant 
criticisms. The study does not thoroughly address every 
facet of each theory, only looking at its main argument and 
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its fit with the whole purpose of the study (at the latter 
part of this section) . It is equally important to emphasize 
that these theories are essentially models of politics but 
some of them "help in thinking about public policy" (Dye, 
1992) . 
Pluralism 
While there are variants of this theory such as 
classical pluralism, elite pluralism and neo-pluralism, the 
central theme is that politics and decision making are 
resided largely in the framework of government, however, 
there are many non-governmental groups that use their 
resources to exert influence. Nevertheless, as Robert Dahl 
explains, the central government is "the most effective 
institution for coercion" and the principal allocator of 
state resources (Stone, 1993). In its application to public 
policymaking, it reasons that power is relatively broadly 
(though unequally) distributed among many more or less 
organized interest groups in society that compete with each 
other to control public policy, with some groups tending to 
exert control in one or two issue areas while other groups 
and interests tend to dominate in other issue areas or 
arenas of struggle ("A Glossary of Political Economy 
Terms", n.d.). 
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Regime Theory 
Regime theory's (especially, urban regime 
theory) emphasis on the role of the economy and the private 
sector in influencing political choices seems to remedy the 
insufficiency of the pluralist thought. The theory's main 
argument is that international institutions or regimes 
affect the behavior of states or other international 
actors. However, by lending itself to international 
dynamics, regime theory falls short of the strength of 
pluralism: the important role of domestic actors in 
policymaking. Stephen Krasner defines regimes as a set of 
explicit or implicit "principles, norms, rules, and 
decision making procedures around which actor expectations 
converge in a given issue-area" Krasner, (1982). This 
definition means that regimes need not be states (James, 
2007). If this is the case, (of course, in many instances, 
they are treated as states), it is expected that any 
individual including private individuals can carry new 
innovations from international institutions or arenas into 
their countries especially when such innovations are 
perceived to maximize their profits. While this is 
possible, businesses are supposed to seek regulatory 
permissions from political authorities through executive 
agencies before they can implement such innovations in the 
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country which can be far from easy. Nevertheless, liberal 
regime theorists believe that international institutions at 
most bring about an environment conducive to the 
convergence of state interests, which facilitates regime 
cooperation; and at least, facilitate cooperation that 
might otherwise not have been able to occur in an anarchic 
world. 
Institutionalism 
The contention of which interests to serve; 
those of the state or private interests as highlighted 
above causes rational choice institutionalists to argue 
that the choice of either depends on the 'rules of the 
game'. That is, the theory posits that institutional rules 
alter the behavior of intendedly rational individuals 
motivated by material self-interest (Sabatier, & Weible, 
2014). And so Peters (2011) argues that individuals, in an 
attempt to meet organizational goals, consciously choose to 
be, to some extent, constrained by being members of the 
institution whether they were compelled to be members or 
not. Rational choice institutionalism (RCI) is however only 
one variant of 'new institutionalism' which generally 
recognizes that institutions operate in an environment 
consisting of other institutions, called the institutional 
environment. Every institution is thus influenced by the 
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broader environment (or institutional peer pressure) . In 
this environment, the main objective of organizations is to 
survive. In order to do so, they need to do more than 
succeed economically, they need to establish legitimacy 
within the world of institutions. Peters (2011) mentions 
eight approaches of new institutionalism including RCI 
highlighted above. Historical institutionalism provides an 
interesting approach to new institutionalism. Not only does 
it espouse the importance of history but also how 
historical antecedents in political processes persist to 
provide the basis for present and future political actions. 
And so the adoption of e-payment systems by a political 
system depends on 'path-dependent' choices that were made 
in the past, hence, the survival of this new technology 
would rest on its adaptation or suitability with past 
decision structures. 
The weakness of historical institutionalism as 
an approach of new institutionalism is made up by normative 
institutionalism which is guided by the 'logic of 
appropriateness' and contends that much of the behavior of 
institutional actors is based on the recognized situation 
the actors face, the identity of the actors in the 
situation, and the analysis by the actor of the rules that 
generally govern behavior for that actor in that particular 
situation. That is, political outcomes or actions are no 
longer 'locked in' the system, but that the logic of 
appropriateness means that actions are "matched to 
situations by means of rules organized into identities" 
(March, 1994). 
24 
If normative institutionalism portends chaos in 
organizations, discursive institutionalism is a greater 
culprit of this problem. By arguing that 'ideas' shape 
individuals' behavior which in turn shapes institutions, 
discursive institutionalism challenges the inherent stasis 
with other institutionalisms. Therefore, in The Oxford 
handbook of Political Institutions, Colins Hay states that 
this approach attempts to "capture, describe and 
interrogate institutional disequilibrium". This is perhaps 
born out of the fact that members of an institution do not 
accept ideas blindly (Peters, 2011). To reduce this 
problem, Peters (20110 emphasizes the importance of 
coordinative efforts of members of the institution to 
create, elaborate and justify the ideas in setting policy 
agenda. Thus, communication is the key to consensus. 
However, Peters rightly contends that not all members are 
equal in policy negotiations, some members have access to 
the policy arena while others do not. Sociological 
institutionalism is perhaps the approach that truly 
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embodies the environmental aspect of new institutionalism 
even though others argue that it shares similarities with 
normative institutionalism. This approach argues that 
institutions mimic certain values of its 
environment/society for purposes of gaining legitimacy and 
not necessarily for 'functional' or organizational goals. 
In other words, institutions adopt certain elements of its 
environment-cultural or institutional field just because 
other institutions have those elements even if they are not 
needed in the organization. Thus, perhaps countries in 
southern Africa (Malawi, Botswana and Namibia) which 
adopted the biometric payment system from neighboring South 
Africa did so out of the intention that they are also seen 
as 'technological' or 'sophisticated' countries and not 
necessarily for perceived advantages that the system could 
bring. 
New institutionalism undoubtedly provides a 
great deal of interest on how institutions, regardless of 
the type influence individuals' actions or behavior. 
However, it is important to note that institutions are 
embedded in the 'state', hence their constraining power 
would somehow be influenced by the state. It is logical to 
reason that a democratic or capitalist state would 
influence institutions differently from how a socialist 
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state would impact its institutions. Skopcol (1990) is 
therefore justified when she calls for Bringing the State 
Back in political analysis. This is where old 
institutionalism varies from new institutionalism. For the 
former, public policy is authoritatively determined, 
implemented, and enforced by governmental institutions 
(Dye, 1992). Dye contends that governmental institutions 
offer three distinctive characteristics to public policies; 
legitimacy, universality and coercion. 
Governmental policies are generally seen as 
legal obligations that command the loyalty of the public. 
While policies of other groups and organizations such as 
corporations, churches and a host of others may be seen as 
important and binding, only governmental policies involve 
legal obligations. Second, only government policies extend 
to all people of the society irrespective of social status; 
the policies of other groups he states, only reach a part 
of the society. Lastly, government monopolizes coercion in 
society; that is, only government can legitimately arrest 
and imprison those individuals who violate its policies. 
Therefore, an e-payment should carry enough legitimacy that 
almost all citizens embrace it and deviants are either 
coerced into suing the system or risk going to jail. 
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MODELS FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 
Although regime theory, pluralism, and 
institutionalism can be applied to the policymaking 
process, other theories; punctuated equilibrium, advanced 
coalition theory, public choice theory and policy diffusion 
are considered in this study as more suitable. 
Punctuated Equilibrium 
This theory was originally developed by 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993), and argues that policymaking 
is characterized by long periods of incremental change 
punctuated by brief periods of major policy change 
(Sabatier, 2014). As a result, rarely observed substantial 
policy alterations may take place when opponents of extant 
policy create new perceptions of the issue at stake and 
search for support for their new policy idea (Donelly and 
Hogan, 2012; see also Meijerink, 2005, p. 1064). Therefore, 
Kleistra and Mayer (2001) indicate what they call 
"carriers" (motors for change) and "barriers" (hindrances 
to change) are two sides of the one coin (Donelly and 
Hogan, 2012). Specifically, the model states that policy 
generally goes through incremental changes due to several 
restraints, namely the 'stickiness' of institutional 
cultures, vested interests, and the bounded rationality of 
individual decision-makers. For policy to change therefore, 
there will have to be changes in these conditions, 
especially in party control of government, or changes in 
public opinion. 
This theory would therefore posit that the 
adoption of an e-payment system is functional due to the 
need to adapt to changing situations especially if these 
new situations are born out of change in government or 
regime (for a progressive one) . Such a change however may 
not be reflective of public opinion and the innovation may 
not be the right fit for the society. 
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Advocacy Coalition Network 
The advocacy coalition network, attributed to 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988, 1993), deals with the 
interaction of advocacy coalitions-each comprising actors 
from a variety of institutions with a set of policy beliefs 
(Sabatier & Weible, 2014) and form an alliance to mobilize 
resources to attain greater influence in the policymaking 
process (Nohrstedt & Weible, 2010, p. 16). This approach 
seeks to explain how groups, forming over an issue of 
concern to them, can lead to the development of new ideas 
for change (Donnelly & Hogan, 2012; Jones & Jenkins-Smith, 
2009). On the other hand, Sabatier & Weible, (2007, p. 202) 
contend that for policy change to occur, an external shock 
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is required, such as a macroeconomic crisis whereas for the 
"epistemic approach", policy change may be precipitated by 
uncertainty over a problem (Meijerink, 2005, p. 1063). 
Nevertheless, both approaches show the roles of networks, 
ideas, information and learning processes in policy change 
(Donnelly & Hogan, 2012; Haas, 2004). This means that this 
theory has similar weakness as punctuated equilibrium, the 
only difference is that there is the emphasis on 
collaboration between groups to deal with the change, 
exogenous (Sabatier & Weible, 2007) or endogenous (Jones & 
Jenkins-Smith, 2009) . 
Public Choice Theory 
Public choice theory (PCT) challenges the 
earlier assertion in political science that individuals act 
differently in politics than they do in the marketplace 
(Dye, 1992). PCT posits that all political actors including 
voters, taxpayers, candidates, legislators, bureaucrats, 
technocrats, parties, bureaucracies and governments intend 
to maximize their personal benefits in politics just as in 
the marketplace (Dye, 1992). Furthermore, government itself 
arises from social contract among individuals who consent 
for their mutual interest obey laws and support the 
government in exchange for protection of their personal 
well-being such as liberties and security. 
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Therefore public choice theorists would argue 
that the biometric payment systems introduced in South 
Africa and Ghana was an attempt by the Central Bank or the 
government in these countries to meet their ulterior 
motive, say awarding of the contract for the system's 
implementation to relatives and family members so as to 
share in the profits. However, there were virtually no 
complaints or allegations of corruption targeted at 
authorities during the adoption of the biometric payment 
systems in both countries. This was perhaps due to the 
joint-partnership venture between the state and the private 
entity, Netl UEPS for the implementation of the innovation. 
Perhaps, if the whole project was left in the hands of the 
central government, things would have been different 
Aside the above theories, there are other 
theories that could be deployed in explaining the policy 
process in countries. Rationalism, incrementalism, elite, 
group, and system theories are all useful in understanding 
how policies are formulated. However, like the other 
theories, there is either the overemphasis on individuals 
or the institutional environment, with little combination 
of both variables in explaining policy choices. The study 
therefore posits that these theories do not adequately 
demonstrate how political systems adopt innovations from 
political systems. 
Unlike pluralism, this study is concerned with 
how political systems in general adopt policies from other 
political systems. Although it can be argued that both 
governmental and non-governmental groups have ties with 
international arenas, this is not the focus of the 
pluralist theory. It places heavy emphasis on domestic 
political and public processes with little or no regard to 
its external environment in the shaping of public policies. 
Even if there is the assumption of the interaction with 
international policy actors, as Dahl contends, the central 
government being the crucial decision-maker, does not 
guarantee that the observability of alternative policy 
options elsewhere would necessarily be adopted in the host 
country. The decision to adopt this 'foreign' policy would 
depend on the peculiar interest of the dominant actors in 
the policy negotiations which can go either way. 
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Furthermore, for both institutionalisms, policy 
is an institutional output as posited. However, both 
theories do not fully address the role of environmental 
support, albeit the former attempts to remedy this problem. 
A greater weakness is its silent or no mention of the 
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'policy' itself as an important factor of the political 
process; the heavy emphasis on the actions of policymakers 
in the decision-making process undermines the importance of 
the need for the suitability of those actions to the 
policy. For example, given that new situations may require 
new solutions, historical institutionalism as an approach 
does little to address this problem. The requirements of 
adopting and implementing e-payment systems may require a 
total overhaul of the financial sector that has been in 
place for many decades. In this case, the survival of this 
new technology would have less to do with political 
decisions made by policymakers in the past and more on 
relying new techniques that would perhaps require looking 
elsewhere for policy solutions. However, some historical 
institutionalists, in an attempt to address this problem 
rely on punctuated equilibrium theory or 'critical 
junctures' in the system's development path (this theory is 
addressed later on this section) that redefines the 
political process and become the new foundation for future 
political actions. 
Also, the flexibility in policymaking afforded 
by normative institutionalism by virtue of its 'logic of 
appropriateness' imply that policymakers in trying to 
ensure the success of e-payment system may look for new 
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ways that are suited to it, nevertheless, the institutional 
bounds are still inherent and may still constrain actors' 
actions. Thus, new implementation measures may not be 
optimal in dealing with this new situation. Furthermore, 
the morality content in normative institutionalism portends 
differences in opinions as regards how a particular 
situation should be treated. Also, "it may run counter to 
democratic principles by implying the substitution of tacit 
understanding for collective deliberation" (Balsiger, 
n.d.). Discursive institutionalism also stresses the 
inequality of access to policy negotiations by members of 
an organization. This means that the policies adopted by 
superior members may not necessarily represent the best 
interest of the institution and perhaps that of the society 
at large. Therefore, an e-payrnent system adopted by 
policymakers may not receive the necessary institutional 
support for its survival and success. 
Old institutionalism on the other hand 
maintains that the coercive nature of government policies 
ensures that all residents of a country comply with the 
rules of those policies. However, in reality this is not 
the case, almost all public policies, despite its legal 
force are not accepted by the society. In fact, there are 
many instances whereby the policy itself excludes other 
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groups in the society. In other instances too, the 
organizational and infrastructural base are non-existent to 
ensure the full utilization of that particular policy. 
Regime theory also undermines the political and 
institutional obstacles to the conception of an idea in the 
first place. It assumes that there is a thin line between 
domestic and international interests which is not true in 
many cases. It therefore appears that the adoption of any 
foreign innovation would first have to receive the 
political support in the adopting country before further 
measures can be taken to bring the innovation into full 
force. In short, whereas pluralism fosters greater domestic 
interaction and reinforcement of domestic interests, regime 
theory undermines domestic interplays and rather 
relinquishes the fate of the 'state' into the hands of 
international institutions. Furthermore, punctuated 
equilibrium theory's overemphasis on exogenous factors in 
influencing policy outcomes therefore does not address the 
functionality or otherwise of the new policy in the 
society. Moreover, the theory implies that extant policies 
are discarded for new ideas. This is not the case on many 
occasions, in that existing policies may coexist with new 
inventions and this could threaten the successful 
implementation of the new policy. Thus the adoption of 
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biometric payment system in Ghana may be less effective due 
to the strong attachment of the society to existing norms. 
And so Legro (2000) argues that sometimes a society re-
embraces the old doctrine of doing things if it fails to 
agree on a replacement. Therefore, punctuated equilibrium 
like the other theories highlighted above, does not address 
the suitability of the new policy to the conditions 
existing in the social system; it takes 'changes' as 
givens. 
Scholars of advocacy coalition network, Jones & 
Jenkins-Smith (2009) would argue that the biometric 
payments systems deployed in Ghana and South Africa must 
have been a conscious effort on the part of advocacy 
groups, largely from the financial sectors in both 
countries to change the financial system. According to 
them, this is because groups form over an issue of concern 
to them, and this leads to the development of new ideas for 
change. This was however not the case in the countries as 
the deployment of the technology was an initiative by 
either the Central Bank (Ghana) or the State (South 
Africa). Also, contrary to Sabatier and Weible, the 
adoption of these systems were not as a result of any 
crisis in either society. There were challenges with the 
existing system, but they were definitely not at a crisis 
level. Besides, the advent of this new technology brought 
with it certain challenges which have lived on to date. 
Thus the advocacy coalition theory is also inadequate in 
capturing the effectiveness or otherwise of the biometric 
payment systems in Ghana and South Africa. 
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Lastly, Public choice theory over exaggerates 
the selfish motive of public workers. It assumes that 
public officials would always engage in corrupt practices 
just to achieve their material goals. But as far this study 
is concerned, no corruption allegations were proceeded in 
court against authorities of who spearheaded the adoption 
of the innovation in both countries. In South Africa, the 
technology was actually deployed to reduce corruption and 
this is enough justification to show the misapplication of 
the public choice theory to the adoption of biometric 
payment systems in both Ghana and South Africa. 
This study by relying on Rogers' diffusion 
framework implies that it sees policy diffusion as the best 
theory in explaining the adoption of policy alternatives in 
social systems. The theory is particularly useful in this 
study because it specifically deals with the adoption of 
technological innovations. Biometric payment system as a 
technological innovation is therefore best explained by 
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this theory. Furthermore, it is the most often cited work 
dealing with diffusion. Moreover, as Rogers' points out, 
diffusion is not a single, all-encompassing theory (Yates, 
2001). As the study explains in the next section, Rogers' 
framework incorporates various aspects of the adoption of a 
policy including policy actors, the environment or social 
structure, the process and the attributes of the innovation 
itself. Rogers' diffusion of innovation is therefore 
includes several theoretical perspectives that relate to 
the overall concept of diffusion; it is a meta-theory. 
Therefore before elaborating on Rogers' diffusion of 
innovation particularly his characteristics of innovations 
theory, it is important to understand the tenets of general 
diffusion theory. 
Policy Diffusion: A More Useful Approach 
Policy innovation here means a process whereby 
a government-a national legislature, state agency, or a 
city adopts a new policy (Shipan and Volden, 2008; Mintrom 
1997a; Walker 1969) . While the basis for such adoption can 
come from within the political system such as from interest 
groups, policy innovation can also come from outside the 
polity, with the spread of innovation from one government 
to another, a process known as policy diffusion (Shipan and 
Volden, 2008). The latter is the emphasis of this study. 
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There are generally four processes of policy diffusion that 
are found in the extant literature: learning, economic 
competition, imitation, and coercion. Throughout this 
discussion, for the purpose of simplicity, mention is made 
of the 'country' or 'state' taking action, that is learning 
or competing or any of the mechanisms, for example. 
However, it is worthy to note that individual decision 
makers are the critical actors in these countries, example, 
the Governor of Bank of Ghana. 
The first mechanism of diffusion that the study 
examines is learning. By observing the politics of policy 
adoption and the impact of those policies, policymakers can 
learn from the experiences of other governments. Thus, for 
Berry and Baybeck, the main proponents of policy diffusion 
(Sabatier & Weible, 2014) "when confronted with a problem, 
decision makers simplify the task of finding a solution by 
choosing an alternative that has proven successful 
elsewhere" (2005, pg 505). This is similar to advocacy 
coalition network theorist, Meijerink, 2005 that policy 
change may be precipitated by 'uncertainty' over a problem 
as stated above. However, the difference here is that 
emphasis is on the 'process' rather than a coalition of 
actors who may share similar beliefs. With policy diffusion 
by learning, policymakers of one country need not interact 
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with actors of the other country from where the particular 
policy is being adopted. By merely 'observing', the 
adopting country can learn the experiences of other 
governments. Rather than adopting policies through 
coalition networks, it can only take a single 
representation at a conference by a policymaker to decide 
adopting the lessons of the conference in his or her 
country. A case in point is Bolivia's pension privatization 
which was based on Chile's pension privatization system 
(Starke, 2013). 
The Finance Ministry's budget director, Helga Salinas, 
attended the annual conference of the business peak association, 
Confederaci6n de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia (CEPB). The keynote 
speaker was the architect of Chile's reform, Jose Pinera 
(interviewwithCuevas2002) . Widely credited with great persuasive 
powers, Pinera advertised his innovation with missionary zeal. Salinas 
was so captivated that she took Pinera aside and kept talking to him 
over lunch. She depicts this encounter as an eye-opening experience, a 
crucial turning point in her ongoing efforts to combat pension 
problems, and the starting point of the privatization project, which 
drew on very extensive advice and consultations with Chilean experts 
during the following years (interviews with Salinas 2002 and Bonadona 
2002). 
Thus while it may seem as an advocacy coalition 
network (consultations between Chilean and Bolivia policy 
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experts), this was clearly after the main actor, the budget 
director had 'learnt' of the policy in the first place. So 
once learning has taken place, it is easy for diffusion to 
follow. However, learning involves a determination of 
whether a policy adopted elsewhere has been largely 
successful as was the case in Chile which led Bolivia 
adopting the former's pension privatization model. 
Similarly, an assessment of the ability to implement an 
innovation is also likely to be a component of the learning 
process. And so Nicholson-Crotty & Carley (2015) argues 
that potential adopters are likely to ask not only, "Was 
the policy effective in other states that adopted it?" but 
also, "Can we make the policy work for us?" 
The second mechanism is economic co~petition, 
albeit some scholars raise it in conjunction with learning, 
(Shipan, & Volden, 2008). However, Boehmke and Witmer 
(2004) by studying state adoption of Indian gaming 
'compacts', argue that both mechanisms are important in 
explaining initial adoptions, whereas only economic 
competition explains subsequent compacts because previous 
experience with one's own compacts removes the need to 
learn from the experience of others (Shipan, & Volden, 
2008). Thus, Ghana may have learned biometric payment 
system from South Africa, but subsequent alterations in its 
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system may be attempts to make its system the dominant 
force or the best in Africa. As Breckenridge (2010) 
indicated, Ghana's biometric payment system although it was 
installed by a South African firm, had features that were 
different from the latter's. However, it can be reasoned 
that economic competition as a diffusion mechanism is more 
relevant in the private sector than in the public sector or 
at least, among unitary states. Berry and Baybeck (2005) 
for instance, argue that learning can take place across 
states generally, while economic competition is typically 
confined to individuals living near state borders (in the 
US). 
The third mechanism, imitation, is grounded in 
the idea that decision makers may choose policies in order 
to show that they are behaving in a proper and adequate 
manner (Braun, & Gilardi, 2006; Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 
349). In other words, actors copy the actions of another in 
order to look like that other. So under the learning 
mechanism, the policy is adopted for functional purposes 
and policymakers are more interested in whether the policy 
would be effective or not. That is, there is the focus on 
the policy itself, whereas with imitation, the focus is on 
the other government (Shipan, & Volden, 2008). The danger 
with this mechanism is that countries risk adopting the 
same policies of innovative countries without necessarily 
thinking about the consequences of such adoptions. Thus in 
South Africa, there was no other country to learn 
experiences of biometric payment system from so it could 
not have imitated this innovation. Diffusion by imitation 
is therefore inspired by sociological institutionalism 
which also implies that units have to conform to their 
normative environment (Gilardi, 2014). However, it is hard 
to dispute that Ghana adopted the biometric payment system 
with noble intentions-for financial inclusion and to 
harmonize transactions in the banking system. This is even 
more so in South Africa, which was the first country to 
experiment with this innovation where it was deployed to 
enhance the distribution of social grants. 
42 
Last but not least is diffusion by coercion. In 
the international setting, and as pertaining to this study, 
countries can coerce one another through trade practices 
and economic sanctions. They can attempt to coerce others 
directly, or can do so through international institutions 
like the United Nations and the International Monetary 
Fund, which encourage or pressure governments to take 
actions that meet common expectations (Shipan, & Volden, 
2008) . Both South Africa and Ghana biometric payment 
systems were not adopted as a result of international 
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pressure from donor countries or the Bretton Wood 
institutions. Where the biometric payment system has 
benefited from donor support directly and indirectly, no 
foreign country recommended this policy in the first place 
and any donation has been appropriated at the discretion of 
the Central Bank and Ghana Interbank Payment and Settlement 
Systems, the subsidiary of the former that is charged with 
the oversight control of the system. 
In conclusion, while the study attributes the 
adoption of the biometric payment system in Ghana to the 
process of diffusion, it does not subscribe to diffusion by 
imitation, economic competition and coercion, but 
specifically to the process of learning. Four 
justifications are given for this conclusion. The first 
clear evidence is the fact that South Africa was the first 
country to adopt this innovation on the continent of 
Africa, consequently, other neighboring countries adopted 
it. As a corollary to the above point, no country in West 
Africa had this payment system in place which could have 
served as a leaning point to Ghana, hence, it goes to say 
that the only suitable country to learn from was South 
Africa. As the saying goes, "If you want to learn, learn 
from the best". Second, the fact that a South-African firm 
that was deployed for the implementation of the e-zwich in 
Ghana attest to the assumption that the biometric payment 
ideas was adopted from South Africa. 
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In showing that "policy effectiveness is 
inexorably linked to implementation choices", Nicholson-
Crotty, & Carley (2015) argue that policymakers work hard 
to ensure that policies are administered in a way that 
commensurate with their preferences. As a result, they 
further contend that they might pref er adoption information 
from states with which they share demographic and 
ideological characteristics, lawmakers may place greater 
weight on effectiveness information from states that share 
similar implementation capacities or environments. And so 
the founder of Netl UEPS, the developer of the biometric 
payment systems in both Ghana and South Africa, as well as 
the Governor of the Central Bank of Ghana, asserted that 
the innovation is most suited to the African rural setting 
due to its offline feature (Breckenridge, 2010) . 
This study therefore assumes that Ghana adopted 
the biometric payment technology from South Africa because 
it believed that it shared similar characteristics with 
South Africa that would make the system effective in Ghana 
as much as it was in South Africa. The logic of this 
position is that the simple spread of policies from one 
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jurisdiction to another could be caused by any number of 
factors, but if we see that jurisdictions are copying 
successful policies and forgoing those that prove 
ineffective, then we can assert with greater confidence 
that policy learning is contributing to diffusion 
(Nicholson-Crotty, & Carley (2015). However, the perception 
of successful policies elsewhere does not guarantee success 
in other jurisdictions. This obviously has to do with the 
conditions in place in the adopting nation as well as the 
innovation itself and the interplay of both factors. As a 
result, some indicators need to be available to serve as 
guidelines in measuring the effectiveness of an adopted 
policy. One way of assessing the effectiveness of an 
adopted innovation can be found in Rogers' characteristics 
of innovation framework, which he posits in his book, 
Diffusion of Innovations. The book is examined (only 
briefly) in the following section. 
Diffusion of Innovation 
Rogers (2003) Diffusion of Innovation is 
broader than what is captured here, but his main argument 
was on the role of participants in a social system in the 
innovation-diffusion process. Rogers argues that diffusion 
is the process by which an innovation is communicated 
through certain channels over time among the participants 
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in a social system. Rogers proposes that four main elements 
influence the spread of a new idea: the innovation itself, 
communication channels, time, and a social system. However, 
his main emphasis was on human capital (adopters). Rogers' 
emphasis on this crucial role of individuals in influencing 
the rate of adoption of innovation encouraged him to posit 
that the key to adoption is that the person must perceive 
the idea, behavior, or product as new or innovative and 
that it is through this that diffusion would occur 
("Diffusion of Innovation Theory", n.d.). As a result, the 
characteristics of the target population are the essential 
ingredients that will help or hinder adoption of the 
innovation, hence determining its success or failure. He 
therefore defined five adopter categories of a population 
in any given country and argues that when promoting an 
innovation, there are different strategies used to appeal 
to the different adopter categories. They are Innovators, 
Early Adopters, Early Majority, Late Majority and Laggards. 
Innovators are people who want to be the first 
to try the innovation. They are adventuresome and willing 
to experience new ideas. Hence, they should be prepared to 
deal with 'unprofitable' and 'unsuccessful' innovations, 
and a certain level of uncertainty about the innovation. 
These people are very willing to take risks, and are often 
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the first to develop new ideas. Very little effort, if 
anything, needs to be done to appeal to this population. 
Early Adopters are people who represent opinion leaders. 
They enjoy leadership roles, and embrace change 
opportunities. With regard to the e-zwich system for 
example, such an individual would be the governor of the 
Central Bank of Ghana, Dr. Paul Acquah whose "progressive" 
inclinations largely influenced the adoption of the 
biometric system in Ghana. Without his expert approval of 
the technology, based on the perceived 'relative 
advantages' that the system would bring to the financial 
system in Ghana, perhaps the innovation would not have been 
adopted in the first place. Thus, such individuals are 
already aware of the need to change and so are very 
comfortable adopting new ideas. Strategies to appeal to 
this population include how-to manuals and information 
sheets on implementation. They do not need information to 
convince them to change. Early Majority on the other hand 
are rarely leaders, but they do adopt new ideas before the 
average person (Diffusion of Innovation Theory, n.d.). 
However, they typically need to see evidence that the 
innovation works before they are willing to adopt it. 
Therefore, in appealing to this population, strategies such 
as success stories and evidence of the innovation's 
effectiveness can be deployed. ("Diffusion of Innovation 
Theory", n.d.). In short, their adoption of an innovation 
is a more conscious effort comparative to Innovators and 
Early Adopters. 
People who are skeptical of change, and will 
only adopt an innovation after it has been tried by the 
majority form the Late Majority category. Strategies to 
influence the attitude of this population include 
information on how many other people have tried the 
innovation and have adopted it successfully. To reduce the 
uncertainty of the innovation, interpersonal networks of 
close peers should persuade the late majority to adopt it. 
Then, "the late majority feel that it is safe to adopt" 
(Sahin, 2006; Rogers, 2003, p. 284). Lastly, Laggards are 
those who are strongly attached to tradition and very 
conservative. They are very doubtful of change and are the 
most difficult group to bring into the fray. Strategies to 
appeal to this population include statistics, fear appeals, 
and pressure from people in the other adopter groups. 
("Diffusion of Innovation Theory", n.d.). 
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Despite his five categories of adopters, Rogers 
(2003) further divided them into two main groups: earlier 
adopters and later adopters. Earlier adopters comprises 
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innovators, early adopters, and early majority, while late 
majority and laggards are the later adopters. Rogers 
identifies the differences between these two groups on the 
basis of socioeconomic status, personality variables, and 
communication behaviors, which usually are positively 
related to innovativeness (Sahin, 2006). For instance, "the 
individuals or other units in a system who most need the 
benefits of a new idea (the less educated, less wealthy, 
and the like) are generally the last to adopt an 
innovation" (Rogers, 2003, p. 295). For Rogers, there was 
no significant difference between the ages of earlier 
adopters and later adopters, but this categorization and 
its characteristics are beyond this study. Rogers postulate 
on this adopter category however portends certain issues. 
First, it is not clear whether adopters should 
be seen as policymakers or all individuals in a social 
system. It appears that he alternates between these two 
types of individual. For example, while he describes (to a 
greater extent) Early Majority as consisting of individuals 
who hold leadership roles, Later Majority and Laggards are 
cast as comprising largely pf the hoi polloi of the 
society. The problem with this lack of specification is 
that, it is rarely disputed that elites, especially ruling 
elites are the main initiators of policies. The decision to 
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adopt an innovation or not, rests almost entirely with 
these individuals even to the extent of ignoring expert 
advice on the consequences of such policy. While the masses 
can influence policy choice through public outcry and the 
like, the decision to consent to it or clamp down on any 
agitations is determined by the ruling elite. Second, it is 
far from straightforward to clearly delineate the 
population of any social system into his five adopter 
categories. For instance, do the various categories of 
adopters remain the same for any innovation? Do they remain 
the same irrespective of the number of years after adoption 
of the innovation? So many questions can be posed that 
could challenge this theory of adopters, especially with 
regard to its generalization to other social systems. 
Rogers deals with some these challenges by indicating that 
diffusion manifests itself in different ways in various 
cultures and fields and is highly consequential to the type 
of adopters and 'innovation-decision process' which he 
defined as "an information-seeking and information-
processing activity, where an individual is motivated to 
reduce uncertainty about the advantages and disadvantages 
of an innovation" (Sahin, 2006; Rogers, p. 172). 
To surmise, Rogers proposes five steps involved 
in the innovation-decision process; (1) knowledge, (2) 
persuasion, (3) decision, (4) implementation, and (5) 
confirmation. The innovation-decision process starts with 
the knowledge stage. Here, an individual learns about the 
existence of innovation and seeks information about the 
innovation. "What?" "how?," and "why?" are the critical 
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questions in the knowledge phase (Sahin, 2006) . At this 
phase, the individual tries to find out "what the 
innovation is and how and why it works". It is however 
worthy to note that while knowledge is important in the 
rate of adoption, individual's attitude also shapes the 
adoption or rejection of the innovation. With regard to the 
persuasion step, the individual forms a negative or 
positive attitude toward the innovation, but "the formation 
of a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward an innovation 
does not always lead directly or indirectly to an adoption 
or rejection" (Rogers, 2003, p. 176). The individual 
develops the attitude after he or she knows about the 
innovation, so the persuasion stage occurs after the 
knowledge stage in the innovation-decision process. 
The decision stage in the innovation-decision 
process where the individual chooses to adopt or reject the 
innovation. Rogers explains that while adoption refers to 
the "full use of an innovation as the best course of action 
available," rejection means "not to adopt an innovation" 
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(Rogers, 2003, p. 177). If an innovation is tried on a 
smaller basis prior to full implementation, it is usually 
adopted more quickly, due to the fact that most individuals 
would first want to try the innovation in their own 
situation and then decide whether to adopt it or not 
(Sahin, 2006). The implementation stage is where the 
innovation is put into practice. Nevertheless, there is 
still some level of uncertainty about the innovation with 
regard to its outcomes. Thus, the implementer may need 
technical assistance from change agents and others to 
reduce the degree of uncertainty about the consequences. 
Moreover, the innovation-decision process will end, since 
"the innovation loses its distinctive quality as the 
separate identity of the new idea disappears" (Rogers, 
2003, p. 180). 
These questions raised above and others are the 
main reasons why this study choose not to focus on Rogers' 
framework on innovation adopters, but rather on his 
framework on the characteristics of innovation. With the 
latter, the emphasis is not on the 'adopter' per se, but on 
the inherent attributes of the innovation itself relative 
to the conditions in place in the adopting nation. By 
focusing on the characteristics of relative advantage, 
compatibility, complexity, trialability and observability 
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of innovations, the 'adopters' are defined specifically as 
policymakers, and not any individual of the social system. 
While the success of the innovation may depend on the 
ordinary people, this issue is only secondary and only 
comes in after the adoption of the innovation by 
policymakers in the first place. Furthermore, the issue of 
the conditions in the adopting country is paramount; since 
diffusion of innovations occurs in the social system, it is 
influenced by the social structure of the social system 
(Sahin, 2006) . 
For Rogers (2003), structure is "the patterned 
arrangements of the units in a system" (p. 24). And so he 
concludes further that the nature of the social system 
affects individuals' innovativeness, which is the main 
criterion for categorizing adopters. So clearly, the crux 
of his theory is the interplay of social structure and the 
attributes of the innovation itself in the process of 
diffusion and it is for this reason that the study relies 
solely on this part (characteristics of innovations) of his 
theory. In other words, while Rogers places heavy emphasis 
on the role of actors in the social system, he clearly 
situates their attitudes as a function of their 
environment, hence, it makes sense to rather focus the 
study on these social conditions and their interaction with 
the characteristics of the innovation itself to draw more 
useful conclusions from the theory and its application to 
biometric payment systems in the case studies. A caveat 
however is that, actors perception of his or her 
environment may not be the accurate picture or certain 
environmental factors are perceived as relatively more 
important than others, thereby, facilitating the adoption 
of a particular policy. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
This study employs the case study approach. In 
doing case study research, the "case" being studied may be 
an individual, organization, event, or action, existing in 
a specific time and place. It involves the description of a 
management situation and is often associated with 
descriptive or exploratory research, without being limited 
to these areas (Kumaga, 2010). However, while case study 
often involves data collection through multiple sources, 
such as verbal reports, personal interviews and 
observations as primary data sources (Ghauri, 1983; Bonoma, 
1985; Yin, 1994 in Kumaga, 2010), this study relies solely 
on secondary data in the form of existing literature. In 
other words, it is a literature-based research case study. 
The study then situates the e-zwich system in Rogers' 
framework of diffusion of innovations in an attempt to 
explain if the author's characteristics of innovation were 
inherent in the adoption of the e-zwich policy. In other 
words, did the e-zwich system exhibit the features of 
innovation necessary for it to be adopted in Ghana? 
The study, in an attempt to better understand 
the author's framework and to highlight the positives and 
the weaknesses of the e-zwich system, does a comparative 
case study of South Africa's biometric payment system first 
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implemented in KwaZulu-Natal and later in neighboring 
Eastern Cape Province. It was later developed into a 
national payment system for the distribution of social 
grants. The KwaZulu payment system is also applied to 
Rogers' framework to ascertain which features of the system 
satisfied the author's framework thereby making it 
relatively successful. In short, the main aim of the study 
is to assess the effectiveness of the e-zwich system on one 
hand and to examine if Rogers's characteristics held true 
in these two countries. If one system was successful, did 
it exhibit Rogers's characteristics? If not, what are the 
implications for Rogers's framework? 
As an alternative research method, the study 
could adopt the survey technique. On the one hand, 
administering questionnaires to both subscribers and non-
subscribers alike and assessing their views on the benefits 
and challenges they face in using the card in general, or 
administering questionnaires to only users of the system, 
on the other hand. The former is the technique employed by 
Agyeiwaah, Anane, Appiah, and Opoku-Ware (2014). The 
authors, focusing on three selected branches of Ghana 
Commercial Bank, the country's largest commercial bank in 
the Kumasi zone, targeted 120 E-Zwich card bearers and 43 
non e-zwich card bearers. Similarly, Issahaku (2012), in 
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examining the challenges associated with the use of e-zwich 
in retail payments, administered semi-structured 
questionnaires in Wa municipality (in the northern region 
of Ghana) to fifty (50) e-zwich card bearers and thirty 
(30) non e-zwich card bearers. Kumaga (2010) on the other 
hand employed a mixed approach including deep interviews 
with the Ghana Interbank Payment and Settlement Systems 
(GhIPSS) and senior officials of some of the major banks in 
Ghana and questionnaires distributed to shops and 
individuals that use e-zwich and other debit cards such as 
VISA and MasterCard. (Agyeiwaah, Anane, Appiah, and Opoku-
Ware (2014). In the most recent study on the e-zwich 
system, Antwi, Hamza, & Bavoh, (2015) adopts questionnaire 
administration to ascertain the common types of e-payment 
systems, the level of adoption of e-zwich, and the factors 
influencing its effectiveness. 
Quansah, Andoh-Baidoo, & Midha, (2010) adopt a 
different technique; they perform Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis on the 
implementation of the e-zwich system and map the findings 
from the SWOT analysis to PPT and GTZ management frameworks 
models. Similar to this literature-review based case study, 
Breckenridge (2010) does a review of secondary data, 
looking into official data and records as well as some 
newspaper stories of the implementation of the e-zwich 
system, stating some challenges but highlighting the 
potential of the system. 
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So it is evident that the survey method has 
been extensively employed to analyze the effectiveness of 
the e-zwich system. However, survey methods are more 
appropriate in addressing 'how often something has 
happened' (Yin, 2012), but this question, the study does 
not address neither is it examining the initiative's (e-
zwich's) effectiveness in producing a particular outcome 
per se, in which case, Yin suggests that experiments and 
quasi-experiments would be more appropriate. Rather, the 
study is interested in finding out if those 'outcomes' that 
were perceived by policy makers to be produced by the 
system have already been produced or not. And if it has 
not, did the e-zwich system portray Rogers's 
characteristics of innovation before it was adopted or not? 
Thus, the study looks at post-implementation effects of the 
e-zwich system, and seeks to analyze its effectiveness 
through the lens of Rogers' characteristics innovation of 
characteristics framework. 
Therefore, the case study approach was employed 
for this study because as Yin (2012) contends, case studies 
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are essential when the research addresses either a 
descriptive question-"What is happening or has happened?"-
or an explanatory question-"How or why did something 
happen?" (Yin, 2012). More specifically, what is happening 
to the e-zwich system? Furthermore, as indicated earlier, 
the study relies heavily on existing literature, mainly, 
scholarly work on the implementation of the e-zwich system 
including its challenges as well as reviewing newspaper and 
website stories that discuss the e-zwich system. The study, 
by employing the interview method would have required 
certain sensitive questions, especially with regard to the 
role of relevant authorities in charge of the e-zwich 
system (for example, officials of Ghana Interbank Payment 
Settlement Systems; GhIPSS). Some officials may over 
exaggerate or under estimate their functions toward 
effective functioning of the system. Thus, data collection 
for the study is literature-based as valuable research 
questions could involve sensitive subjects which would have 
been unsuitable for primary data collection ("Guide To 
Undergraduate Dissertations in the Social Sciences", n.d.) 
Moreover, while a case study of the e-zwich 
system within its real-world context, hence favors the 
collection of data in natural settings, compared with 
relying on "derived" data (Bromley, 1986, p. 23 in Yin 
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2012), collecting data through in-depth interviews, 
participant observation recordings and field notes, non-
participant observation, or some combination of these, 
would require extensive period of time, a luxury that the 
author does not have given other academic commitments for 
the semester. Therefore, the literature-based case 
methodology for this study was chosen out of convenience to 
the author. Furthermore, the study wanted to avoid the 
possibility of not receiving responses on time or not all 
by respondents. In an effort to obtain information on the 
current number of subscribers of the e-zwich system, I 
emailed GhIPSS, so many months after the email sent, I am 
yet to receive a reply to my email. So initially, the study 
had the intention of sending out questionnaires to relevant 
officials of the organization as well officials of the Bank 
of Ghana, however, this setback affirmed my suspicion of 
employing a mixed method approach. Hence, I decided to rely 
solely on secondary data. 
Justification for the choice of cases; 
biometric systems in both Ghana and Nigeria, is 
straightforward. The founder of Netl UEPS, a subsidiary of 
Nekwan Applied Technology Holdings Limited (Aplitec) that 
installed biometric systems in both countries indicated 
that the smart card technology was developed with the aim 
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of initiating banking and providing banking services to the 
rural poor where existing formal institutions could not 
reach due to lack of appropriate technology. In other 
words, the technology was the key to bridging the gap and 
to forming links between the informal and the formal 
sectors ('Pension Pay-out Contractors: follow-up briefing", 
n.d.). Both countries have a significant proportion of 
their population being poor, therefore, the implementation 
of the technology would come with some anticipated 
benefits. Since South Africa was the first country to have 
implemented this biometric payment system on the continent 
as well as having a South-African based private firm that 
delivered this biometric payment in Ghana, making 
comparisons between the features, successes and challenges 
between the respective systems in both countries would 
provide useful insights and understanding to policy 
diffusion and policy making to scholars, politicians and 
policy practitioners. 
ROGERS' CHARACTERISTICS OF INNOVATION 
Rogers (2003) defined the innovation-diffusion 
process as "an uncertainty reduction process" (p. 232), and 
he proposes attributes of innovations that help to decrease 
uncertainty about the innovation (Sahin, 2006) . Attributes 
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of innovations includes five characteristics of 
innovations: relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, 
trialability, and observability. Rogers (2003) stated that 
how individuals perceive these characteristics influences 
the rate of adoption of innovations. Sahin (2006) provides 
a comprehensive review of Rogers' five characteristics of 
innovation as described below. 
RELATIVE ADVANTAGE 
Rogers (2003) defined relative advantage as 
"the degree to which an innovation is perceived as being 
better than the idea it supersedes" (p. 229). The cost and 
social status motivation aspects of innovations are 
elements of relative advantage. Thus some policy makers may 
be more status-motivated for adopting innovations, while 
for others, it may be less significant. Moreover, Rogers 
classified innovations into two types: preventive and 
incremental (non-preventive) innovations. "A preventive 
innovation is a new idea that an individual adopts now in 
order to lower the probability of some unwanted future 
event" (Rogers, 2003, p. 233). Preventive innovations 
usually have a slow rate of adoption so their relative 
advantage is highly uncertain. 
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However, he contends that incremental 
innovations provide beneficial outcomes in a short period. 
And so if any nation reckons that adopting biometric 
payment system in the allocation of social welfare benefits 
or as a means of financial inclusion has value, it is most 
likely to adopt this technology. To increase the rate of 
adopting innovations and to make relative advantage more 
effective, direct or indirect monetary payment incentives 
may be used to support the individuals of a social system 
in adopting an innovation. Incentives are part of support 
and motivation factors. Another motivation factor in the 
diffusion process is the compatibility attribute. 
COMPATIBILITY 
Rogers (2003) stated that "compatibility is the 
degree to which an innovation is perceived as consistent 
with the existing values, past experiences, and needs of 
potential adopters" (p. 15). A lack of compatibility in IT 
with individual needs may negatively affect the 
individual's IT use (McKenzie, 2001; Sherry, 1997; in 
Sahin, 2006). Hoerup (2001) "describes that each innovation 
influences teachers' opinions, beliefs, values, and views 
about teaching" (Sahin, 2006) . If an innovation matches 
with an individual's needs, then uncertainty will decrease 
and the rate of adoption of the innovation will increase. 
And so the name of the innovation is an important part of 
compatibility. What the innovation is called should be 
meaningful to the potential adopter. The meaning of the 
innovation should also be clear. This is also part of the 
complexity attribute. 
COMPLEXITY 
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Rogers (2003) defined complexity as "the degree 
to which an innovation is perceived as relatively difficult 
to understand and use" (p. 15). Contrary to the other 
attributes, complexity is negatively correlated with the 
rate of adoption. Too much complexity of an innovation is 
an important impediment in its adoption. A technological 
innovation might confront faculty members with the 
challenge of changing their teaching methodology to 
integrate the technological innovation into their 
instruction (Parisot, 1995 in Sahin 2006), so it might have 
different levels of complexity. If hardware and software 
are user-friendly, then they might be adopted successfully 
for the delivery of course materials (Martin, 2003 in Sahin 
2006) . Likewise, a biometric technology that frustrates 
customers due to technical hitches renders its 
accessibility limited even after the adoption of the 
technology. 
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TRIALABILITY 
With regard to trialability, Rogers (2003) 
defined it as the "degree to which an innovation may be 
experimented with on a limited basis" (p. 16). Also, 
trialability is positively correlated with the rate of 
adoption. The more an innovation is tried, the faster its 
adoption. One advantage of this is that reinvention may 
occur during the trial of the innovation, especially at the 
implementation stage. As a result, the innovation may be 
changed or modified by the potential adopter. Increased 
reinvention may create faster adoption of the innovation. 
For the adoption of an innovation, another important factor 
is the secondhand or indirect trial, which is especially 
helpful for later adopters. However, Rogers indicated that 
Earlier Adopters see the trialability attribute of 
innovations as more important than Later Adopters. Thus, a 
biometric payment system that is piloted before launching 
it on a wider scale has greater chance of achieving its 
aims for which it was set up. And the more it is tried, the 
better those results. 
OBSERVABILITY 
The last characteristic of innovations that 
Rogers highlights is observability. He defined 
observability as "the degree to which the results of an 
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innovation are visible to others" (p. 16). Role modeling 
(or peer observation) is the key motivational factor in the 
adoption and diffusion of technology (Parisot, 1997). 
Similar to relative advantage, compatibility, and 
trialability, observability also is positively correlated 
with the rate of adoption of an innovation. And so where 
the successes of the innovation in one country are obvious 
to surrounding nations and to even more distant ones, the 
greater the likelihood that those nations would adopt the 
particular innovation. It is therefore no wonder that 
countries closer to South Africa (Namibia, Botswana and 
Malawi), which was the first nation in Sub-Saharan Africa 
to have adopted the biometric technology. Not surprisingly, 
these biometric payment systems were installed in these 
countries by the same firm, Netl UEPS. 
MEASUREMENT OF ROGERS' VARIABLES IN GHANA AND SOUTH AFRICA 
Measurement here does not imply any statistical 
or mathematical definitions of Rogers' variables, but 
rather, some suggestions of indicators based on which these 
variables can be identified in both countries. By 
implication, these characteristics of innovation must have 
been existent before the adoption of the biometric payment 
technology in both South Africa and Ghana. Thus, once the 
technology has been implemented, there must be clear 
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evidence to show that indeed, Rogers' characteristics were 
perceived to be existing prior to implementation and were 
actually existent based on the 'success' of the system. 
Rogers' framework implies that where any innovation is 
going through critical difficulties it invariably means 
that the characteristics of innovation were not present 
prior to adoption and implementation and neither has there 
been any current attempt to put those prerequisites in 
place or the attempts are simply not enough. And so as long 
as they are absent, the true potential of the innovation 
will not be realized. In short, where the innovation is 
struggling in the adopted country, it means that the 
characteristics of relative advantage, trialability, 
compatibility, complexity, and observability were absent 
prior to implementation and still absent. 
Therefore, there has to be certain indicators 
in the adopted country that show the existence or otherwise 
of these characteristics of innovation. In other words, 
these characteristics must be evident even after 
implementation of the innovation: the following suggests 
some indicators that should be observed with Ghana and 
South Africa's biometric payment systems to validate or 
invalidate Rogers' framework for policy adoption as well as 
assessing the effectiveness or success of both systems in 
the respective countries. 
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Relative Advantage: With regard to relative 
advantage, the main question to be asked is, "would a 
biometric payment system provide certain advantages that 
existing payment platforms do not provide?" In other words, 
the biometric payment system should be perceived to afford 
potential security than existing universal payment system 
in the country mainly VISA and MasterCard. Also, does it 
afford greater affordability and most importantly, 
accessibility than existing payment forms? In short, any 
perceived advantages that the new biometric payment system 
is believed to provide must be existent prior to the 
adoption of the technology. Where such relative advantages 
are non-existent or existing payment forms perform similar 
functions, then it can be concluded that the advent of the 
new biometric payment system would not serve any extra 
purposes in the economy. And so in effect, it must be shown 
that in both Ghana and South Africa, these advantages have 
been clearly achieved and visible to all. The system must 
have brought with it, increased income, reduced cost, and 
included more rural people in the banking sector (the main 
goal of the policy in both countries) or other factors that 
may make adopting this practice advantageous over other 
alternatives, including doing nothing. 
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Compatibility: In both countries, not only must 
there be a favorable infrastructure to support the 
biometric technology, there must also be favorable cultural 
norms in support of it. Hence, the higher the similarity 
with existing norms, the better the chances of adoption. 
Thus, ideas that miss the Compatibility factor are often 
described as "ahead of their time." (Burkus, n.d.). 
Therefore, both countries must have certain cultural norms 
that do not defeat the perceived advantages that the 
technology is likely to bring and perhaps most importantly, 
the needed physical infrastructure must be present to 
facilitate implementation. Religious beliefs, in both 
countries for example, should not discourage the use of the 
biometric payment system. As typical of most developing 
countries especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, where 
superstition reigns supreme, new policies are often given 
certain religious and cultural interpretations. Therefore, 
Compatibility issues in Ghana and South Africa can be 
something as simple as not having the right resources 
(communication facilities or infrastructure) to implement 
the practice or could involve more philosophical concepts 
such as concern over taking people's fingerprints for 
identification purposes which is an essential feature of 
the biometric technology. Communication problems could be 
manifested through constant breakdown of the system 
inhibiting customer registration as well as transactions. 
Where these problems abound in the countries, it is 
expected to have adverse impact on the system's acceptance 
by the public, hence, affects its usage. 
Complexity: Here, residents in both countries 
must find the biometric payment system an easy-to-use 
product. If it is seen as highly complex or difficult to 
grasp, people will shy away from engaging with the system. 
If this is the case, complaints of the system will be rife 
and sign-ups for the system's smartcard should remain low 
or start declining if numbers initially rose. It therefore 
follows that any attempts to reduce the complexity of the 
system would increase usage of the system by card-bearing 
members as well as encouraging others to sign-up for the 
smartcards. Hence, not only would transaction volume 
increase, the value of the transaction would increase as 
well. Therefore, particularly in Ghana, the e-zwich system 
should record greater number of subscribers and revenue 
over time. 
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Trialability: This feature means that there 
must have been at least one pilot-based implementation of 
the biometric payment system prior to a large-scale 
implementation. The experiment on a smaller, less intensive 
scale could have been undertaken on a regional level or in 
a particular town or city in both countries. As the 
framework suggests, the ability to experiment the 
innovation on a smaller basis and the number of 
experimentations determine the rate of adoption. 
Consequently, the more the innovation is tried on a small 
basis, the greater its success. And so, there must be 
evidence in both countries to the effect that some form of 
trials were initiated before broad-scale implementation. 
Observability: Since Ghana's e-zwich system was 
largely borrowed from South Africa, although with some 
improvements or novelty features, and South Africa being 
the first country to have implemented biometric technology 
on the continent, it suffices to say that observability 
will be higher in the former. The results of South Africa's 
biometric system must have been very noticeable for Ghana 
to have adopted similar technology. It should also be 
continually learning from the experiences of the former. 
This means that Ghana's biometric payment system must have 
been an improvement over that of South Africa, entailing 
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fewer challenges than what the latter faced. One way of 
measuring this characteristic is to assess whether there 
were any policy negotiations between actors (whether 
private or public) of both countries concerning the 
adoption and implementation of the system, with possible 
exchanges between them. South Africa on the other hand, is 
the first country in the world to employ biometric 
technology in the distribution of social grants. Therefore, 
observability is by all standards going to be low. It is 
therefore expected that the biometric payment in place 
should be fraught with major challenges, thereby, rendering 
it ineffective. Any contrary evidence to this expectation 
would be analyzed as a limitation to the generalizability 
of Rogers' framework. 
To surmise, , Rogers (2003) argued that 
innovations offering more relative advantage, 
compatibility, simplicity, trialability, and observability 
will be adopted faster than other innovations lacking these 
attributes. Rogers does caution, "getting a new idea 
adopted, even when is has obvious advantages, is difficult" 
(p. 1), so the availability of all of these variables of 
innovations speed up the innovation-diffusion process. 
However, for Rogers, relative advantage is the strongest 
predictor of the rate of adoption of an innovation. 
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Nevertheless, it needs to be noted that this study is not 
concerned with the 'rate' of adoption innovation or why 
Ghana adopted the biometric system later than earlier. 
Whether an innovation is adopted faster or slower, it still 
needs to exhibit the characteristics that Rogers talk about 
and this study emphasizes them as more crucial than the 
speed with it the innovation is adopted. 
Therefore the effectiveness of the e-zwich 
system depends on the presence of these features in Ghana 
as well as in South Africa. Effectiveness here means the 
achievement of the goals of the system as purported or 
perceived of the system by the Central Bank of Ghana which 
are: for branchless banking, for financial inclusion and 
lastly, for debit facilitation (Antwi, Hamza & Bavoh, 
2015). Where all, not some, of these features are present, 
the study concludes that it satisfied Rogers' framework, 
hence all other things being equal, the e-zwich system 
should achieve its objectives. On the other hand, the 
absence of these characteristics casts a gloomy picture on 
the system's effectiveness and its potential. 
CASE STUDIES 
Ghana's Biometric Money 
E-zwich, introduced in 2008 by the Central 
Bank of Ghana is the world's first biometric money 
(Breckenridge, 2010). It is a national switch payment 
infrastructure for switching and clearing electronic 
payments initiated at payment terminals owned by different 
financial institutions with various types of payment cards 
issued by these financial institutions. (Breckenridge, 
2010; Quansah, A., Andoh-Baidoo, F. K., & Midha, V., 2010; 
Haruna, 2012). In other words, it is a centralized 
mechanism for the settlement of transactions between the 
Ghanaian banks as well as a biometric smartcard for secure 
payment of goods and services. 
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This interbank switch was purchased from and 
managed by the South African company Net 1 UEPS, and it had 
a unique central organizing principle (Breckenridge, 2010) 
The switch was indexed biometrically, using a key derived 
from all ten fingerprints of account holders (Breckenridge, 
2010). This new interbank switch and a smartcard encoded in 
the same way afforded Ghana with the enviable position of 
being the first country to supply biometric money supply. 
However, the main aim of this study is not to focus on this 
novelty but to emphasize its functions which are basically 
similar to other electronic payment systems in many parts 
of the world, such as the MasterCard and Visa. 
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In 2006, Dr Paul Acquah, the then Governor of 
the Central Bank, issued a tender for a national interbank 
switch (a networked central database system that allows all 
banking transactions to be settled) which was won by the 
South African firm, Netl UEPS. The Ghanaian tender had 
several features that distinguish it from similar interbank 
settlement systems such as MasterCard and Visa. According 
to the Governor, one of the key conditions, is for the 
system to 'meet the requirements of the banked and the 
unbanked' and provide a 'smartcard (based on biometric 
identification payment system) which is compatible with the 
national switch'-the national identity card. (Breckenridge, 
2010). It needs to be noted that there had been an earlier 
attempt to develop a biometric national identity card, 
which was locked in parliamentary discussions at the time 
that the e-zwich idea was put forth by the Governor. The 
owner of the firm, Serge Belamont, developed the SASwitch 
in South Africa in the early 1980s, one of the largest and 
earliest settlement systems in the world. The system 
developed by UEPS as Belamant remarked so many times, is 
aimed at the very poor, illiterate people who 'are not 
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going to remember the pin number on the card' 
(Breckenridge, 2010). This was also echoed by the Central 
Bank governor, when he said that Netl's biometric smartcard 
would mean that 'even in the remotest parts of the country 
where electricity and telecommunication facilities are 
unavailable' electronic banking had 'come to the doorstep 
of all Ghanaians' (Breckenridge, 2010). In other words, the 
intention behind the policy was geared to the fact that 
networked communications infrastructure, and electricity, 
are largely absent in much of the African continent. Hence, 
a central payment system should have features that would 
allow transactions to be performed offline. Thus the e-
zwich system and its ability to perform offline 
transactions is suited to the Ghanaian social fabric. 
By the end of 2009, besides Ghana and Nigeria, 
Netl UEPS had delivered large biometrically delivered 
payment systems in place in South Africa, Namibia, 
Botswana, Malawi and Iraq (Breckenridge 2005; 2008) 
However, the UEPS system, is quite different from the 
network-dependent settlement systems used by the EMV 
(Europay, MasterCard and Visa), and most other banks. In 
that, it stores the transaction data on the card itself. 
Meaning, each card carries its own running balance, and a 
history of up to eight-hundred transactions, that can be 
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updated periodically through a networked machine 
(Breckenridge, 2008). The e-zwich card also bears the 
details of the issuing bank but unlike credit or debit 
cards, they carry no individually identifying names and no 
number. Furthermore, they are blank. This is a deliberate 
design to discourage the incentive to steal the cards 
because only the fingerprints of the owner can provide the 
encryption key to access the bank account information The 
cards use a proprietary system of biometric encryption, 
where the data is encoded using a template derived from the 
user's fingerprint impressions (Breckenridge 2010). 
However, the e-zwich cards are of little 
importance to the tiny number of Ghanaians interested in 
online shopping (Breckenridge, 2008. See also Ajao 2008) as 
compared to the MasterCard and Visa cards used in developed 
countries. Individuals can own more than one card just like 
debit and credit cards. In order to make payments or switch 
funds between the cards, users must find a working e-zwich 
point-of-sale (POS) machine. The machines look like 
conventional credit card authorization terminals, except 
that they have fingerprint readers and a slot in the base of 
the machine for the e-zwich card. The Ghanaian banks issue 
the POS machines to merchant account holders, and merchants 
earn a small fee on transfers between card accounts paid 
directly in their own accounts. 
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The Netl smartcard had been tried in South 
Africa where the company gave out social grants to some 5 
million people in the period after 2002 (Breckenridge, 
2008; see also du Toit 2008; Belamant 2006). The e-zwich 
system that was however delivered to Ghana by Netl and 
which won the tender in June 2007 differed in some key 
features from the one that was implemented in South Africa. 
The Ghana Interbank Payment and Settlement System (GhIPSS) 
was, in the first place, owned and authorized by the Bank of 
Ghana, providing it with a legal protected monopoly of all 
bank transactions. Unlike the Aplitec social grants system, 
the Ghanaian contract had a full Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System (AFIS) designed to store and match the 
fingerprints of the entire population of card holders or 
users. These novel features would have profound effects on 
the modus operandi of the GhIPSS system, especially with 
regard to the fact that the income from transactions on the 
cards was under the aegis of the Central Bank 
(Breckenridge, 2010). 
The e-zwich project was hailed as having the 
potential of accruing so many benefits despite so many 
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difficulties that it faced. Even at its early 
implementation stage, there were individuals that were 
quite confident of the potential of the policy, in that the 
expansion of the biometric banking card system was touted 
as having some advantages over the national identification 
programs that were even more catastrophic than the former. 
A number of advantages of the e-zwich system over the 
national identification system was put out there as reasons 
for the potential success of the former. First, the state 
has real influence over the provision of banking facilities. 
Unlike the identity card systems, the Ghanaian biometric 
banking system is a policed monopoly. "An immediate result 
of the issuing of the GhIPSS tender to Netl was that the 
older bank settlement systems were simply prohibited" 
(Breckenridge 2008) . Towards the end of the year in which 
the e-zwich system was launched, these companies and other 
advocates of a free market in banking systems, began to 
complain that the companies that had previously 'provided 
switches and ATMs for various banks in the country, have 
had their services declared illegal with immediate effect 
(Breckenridge, 2010). Second, and perhaps an even more 
important advantage, as argued by advocates of the policy, 
is the state's control over many of the key points at which 
paper money enters the economy. The crucial advantage of 
the e-zwich system per the proponents of the system, 
irrespective of the difficulties in using the cards for 
daily transactions is that it automates and controls the 
state's payroll (Breckenridge 2010). At the launching of 
the project the government promised that all salaried 
employees and almost all the other sites of cash 
transactions-'pensioners, churches, Controller and 
Accountant General's Department (CAGD), Customs Excise and 
Preventive Service (CEPS), Electricity Company of Ghana 
(ECG), rural banks, Savings and Loans Companies and banks 
would become part of the e-zwich system' (GNA 2008a ) . 
Years after the implementation of the project, it is only 
recently that there is a serious attempt by the central 
government to see this initiative through. 
It was recently announced that the Controller 
and Accountant- General's Department is expected to 
commence the payment of all civil servants by a biometric 
e-zwich platform in 2015. Again, the National Service 
Scheme (NSS) , which oversees graduates of all tertiary 
institutions serving compulsory national voluntary service, 
recently took delivery of two-hundred and thirty point-of-
sale-terminal (POS) e-zwich with which 2014-2015 service 
personnel were paid. In reviewing the literature, 
Breckenridge (2010) stated that the new government elected 
80 
in 2008 under the presidency of John Atta Mills, also 
decided to carry out the promise of the former regime, 
anticipating 'the day when its employees will be paid 
through the e-zwich as a means of minimizing the existence 
of ghost workers in government's department payrolls". The 
new administration persuaded the listed companies of the 
Association of Ghana Industries (AG!) to use the cards, 
arguing that they are more efficient in financial 
transactions. Similarly, the Central Bank, in 2009, had a 
lot of consultations with the key organizations of 
recipients of cash payments-coffee growers, vegetable 
farmers, schools-to persuade them to move their members 
over to the smartcard system (most of the time inviting 
banks to attend the meetings in order to sign up users on 
the spot) . 
Furthermore, it was quite easy for the Central 
Bank to coerce the banks to adopt the system as it 
instituted a regulation that required all banks to issue 
the biometric cards at their own expense (Breckenridge 
2010) . They were even required to use them for all 
transactions, including electronic payments and cheque 
clearing; even prepaid cellular call time had to be 
compliant with the e-zwich (Breckenridge, 2010). Moreover, 
officials also encourage small rural lenders to use the e-
81 
82 
zwich cards to mobilize cash deposits for their banks. In 
collaboration with each other, the banks and the officials 
assigned to e-zwich embarked upon intense training programs 
for merchants. Thus, the arrival of the e-zwich system 
provided the potential for so many advantages for the 
financial sector and for the economy at large. 
Thus the potential of the system was quite rife 
initially, especially heralded was the opportunity for 
financial inclusion of rural folks which was emphasized by 
the then president, John Kufuor's when he said that the e-
zwich cards had the potential to 'transform the financial 
services industry and link it with every aspect of the 
nation's economy' and his main concern was the inclusion of 
the 'informal sector' (Breckenridge, 2010). The Central 
Bank governor, Paul Acquah also added that the e-zwich 
cards provided a technological solution for the fact that 
after five decades of independence some 80 percent of the 
population still remained outside the banking system of the 
country (Breckenridge, 2010). It is therefore imperative to 
assess if the key objectives of the project, especially 
with regard to financial inclusion of rural folks have been 
largely realized or not. 
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The Challenges of the E-Zwich System 
The introduction of the e-zwich led to mass 
registration of potential users and distribution of the e-
zwich smart card (Breckenridge, 2010; Boateng, Tetteh and 
Boateng, 2015). However, as time went by and the euphoria 
waned off despite intensive advertisement, the number 
increased at a decreasing rate (Boateng, Tetteh and 
Boateng, 2015). This raises the question as to why after 
more than seven years after the introduction of the E-zwich 
payment system, it has not been able to drastically reduce 
if not eliminate cash transactions in the Ghanaian economy. 
A year after the system had been introduced, a little over 
two-thousand shop owners possessed these machines. The 
cards usability, with regard to performing debit 
transactions efficiently and effectively while maintaining 
high satisfaction was brought into question by many 
subscribers. That is, the cards were still far away from 
transforming the economy into a cash-free one as initially 
touted as a key benefit of the system. In June 2009, for 
example, a reporter in Accra described how, after loading 
money onto his e-zwich card, he 'had to roam the city 
looking for a fuel station which accepts the card, so he 
could refuel his car' (Breckenridge 2008; See also Thompson 
2008; Robertson 2008; Dogbevi 2009; GNA 2009b; Nonor 2009; 
Staff Writer 2009b; Yeboah 2009a). 
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Furthermore, using and maintaining the 
merchants' e-zwich machines were also difficult. There were 
so many reports of angry e-zwich account holders struggling 
fruitlessly to get the cooperation of shop attendants and 
bank tellers. And for the shopkeepers, the machine, due to 
its novel nature also portended chaos at the workplace as 
card holders began to hold them responsible for their 
unexpectedly depleted bank accounts. 'Some of the customers 
come to us with the belief that they have money in their 
cards only to be disappointed by the point of sale device', 
one attendant complained; 'It's a lot of hell.' 
(Breckenridge, 2010). Similarly, some shopkeepers reported 
angry incidents with card holders who had been rejected 
because the machine claimed that they were not the rightful 
custodians of the card (Abdul-Rahman, Attah and Boafo 2009 
in Breckenridge, 2010). The biometric encoding of the cards 
also presented another problem as users frequently battled 
to get the machines to read their fingerprints 
successfully. 
As Breckenridge argued, the most common 
problems underlined the weakness of the communications 
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infrastructure in Ghana. Although the e-zwich has been 
designed to support offline transactions between smartcards, 
merchant owners of the POS machines were required to 
reconcile their transactions with the central server at the 
end of every working day or after eight-hundred 
transactions (Breckenridge, 2010). This connection was 
delivered though the unstable cellular network, which meant 
that merchants had to have on hand, a regular supply of 
electricity, sufficient prepaid airtime to complete the 
connection and a reliable cellular single; These 
difficulties with the system among others, prompted IMAN!, 
the think tank, to state that the e-zwich system is 
bedeviled with so many failures (Breckenridge 2010) . 
Moreover, all bank accounts in the e-zwich 
system are also linked to the national identity number 
(which, in turn, is linked to the biometric patterns in the 
AFIS) , giving the Central Bank the power to record all the 
transactions of all the individuals using the system. 
Meaning in reality, the e-zwich records the biographical 
details, the times, places, and amounts of all transactions 
on the system. As it is currently set up all of this 
information is controlled by Netl and instances of obvious 
fraud are reported to the Central Bank. It is no surprise 
that these extra features of the system have not been 
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publicized; this central government regulation of the money 
supply is contrary to arrangements that have existed in 
West Africa for a very long time, and this presented an 
augury for many Ghanaians to avoid the cards (Breckenridge, 
2010). 
Last but not least, in a largely superstitious 
society, it came as little surprise that some individuals 
attached religious interpretations to this project. There 
were some Ghanaians who believed that e-zwich is one of the 
many attempts in the 'global movement' towards the period 
prophesied in Revelations whereby individuals could not 
perform any financial transaction without having the mark 
of the beast: popularly referred to as '666'. As Osei 
(2008) stated, the constant publicity of the card on radio 
and TV represented in the minds of some as the deliberate 
attempt to promote Ghana as the pioneer in anti-Christian 
activities in Africa. 
South Africa's Biometric Payment System 
South Africa holds the enviable position as the 
country to have deployed biometric technology on the 
continent. Breckenridge (2005) gives a useful account of 
the development of biometric payment system in South 
Africa; this study therefore draws heavily on the author's 
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work. The earliest forms of computerized biometrics in 
South Africa were aimed at regulating the movement and work 
of laborers on the South African gold mines. Since then, 
the technology has moved very rapidly beyond the world of 
industrial work to the payment of social welfare benefits. 
The first large-scale application of fingerprint-based 
digital biometrics was in the delivery of pension benefits 
in the former KwaZulu homeland in 1990. Faced with the task 
of providing pensions to rural areas without anything 
resembling infrastructure and no banking facilities of any 
kind, the KwaZulu government accepted a tender from a joint 
venture of First National Bank and Datakor, a locally owned 
IT firm. The new company was called Cash Payment Services 
(CPS), and it organized the distribution of pensions using 
biometric identification that was, per international 
standards quite mature, even though it was still at an 
early stage of implementation; In 1996, CPS won the 
Computerworld Smithsonian Institution's financial services 
innovation award for its biometric identification software 
(Breckenridge, 2005). By the middle of the 1990s, CPS was 
using four-wheel drive vehicles to distribute pensions in 
the KwaZulu and Kangwane homelands to some 400,000 
individuals. The system initially involved the digital 
registration of fingerprints which were then stored on a 
magnetic strip card and on a central database. Pensioners 
received their cash from the truck mounted dispenser after 
pressing their forefinger onto a CPS scanner attached to a 
computer. 
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As Breckenridge goes on to state, CPS provided 
an adequate solution to the provincial states' 
administrative and infrastructural incapacity, especially 
in the risky distribution of cash pension payments in the 
rural side. By the end of the 1990s, they were providing 
pensions and unemployment benefits to over a million people 
from some 5,000 fixed and mobile sites in six South African 
provinces as well as in neighboring Namibia (Breckenridge, 
2005). In KwaZulu-Natal, the company equipped post offices 
with its fingerprint scanners to channel payments to 
pensioners in the towns and cities. Later on however, this 
single-purpose smartcard was to change. In 1999, CPS was 
bought from First National Bank by Aplitec (its holding 
company is Netl UEPS), an innovative South African IT 
company that specializes in the development and manufacture 
of smartcards. Henceforth, the fingerprint pension 
distribution scheme was transformed into a much more 
powerful multi-functional smartcard. Contrary to a direct 
cash payment after presenting their fingerprints, 
pensioners now received a credit directly onto their 
Aplitec smartcard, which can then be used immediately to 
draw cash from an adjacent cash dispenser. But aside the 
cards performing an identification tool, they were 
primarily intended for the financial inclusion of the cash 
economy of the rural pensioners like Ghana's e-zwich 
system. In other words, to make the pensioners 'bankable'. 
Ever since Aplitec took over the pension 
distribution system, it has been able to reach so many 
pensioners by providing a variety of services. Aplitec 
began to offer automatic deduction facilities to a small 
group of companies providing services including family 
funeral policies and insurance policies. For example, 
Cornestone, a life assurance company provided assurance 
policies to 230,000 pensioners in KwaZulu-Natal and 
Mpumalanga, using Aplitec's risk-free deduction facilities 
provided by the smartcards (Breckenridge, 2005). 
Challenges of the Kwazulu Biometric Payment System 
Despite the successes of Aplitec's biometric 
payment system in KwaZulu, it had certain drawbacks with 
regard to attempts to make the system provide other new 
services. In 1999, as Breckenridge (2005) writes, the 
company partnered with the South African Local and Long 
Distance Taxi and Bus Organization (SALLDTBO) to install 
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smartcard readers on 20,000 taxis operating from the 
organization's 200 ranks. By the end of that year they had 
installed readers on about 2,000 taxis, but the taxi 
installations have not been a success. The smartcard was 
also originally intended to displace the use of cash 
altogether in the payment of retail goods, and utility 
bills. This effort to reorganize the cash economy around 
the Aplitec smartcard seems, to date at least, to have 
failed (Breckenridge, 2005). 
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Furthermore, the Black Sash, a non-violent 
white women's resistance organization in South Africa 
chastised Aplitec that its policy of automated deductions, 
in which the most important choices of service provider and 
payment are left in the control of Aplitec was at a 
financial disadvantage to pensioners. The organization 
reasoned that since Aplitec faces a significant decreased 
risk in the provision of short-term loans to grant-holders, 
hence a guaranteed regular repayments to its investors, the 
company needs to provide discounts to the recipients of the 
loans. 
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Challenges of the Kwazulu Biometric Payment System 
Despite these challenges, the company's hold on 
the distribution of pensions in South Africa strengthened 
to the effect that in 2002, it was awarded part of Eastern 
Cape's pension grant distribution, giving them control of 
more than 70 percent of the welfare and social grant system 
in South Africa. Breckenridge stated that at the start of 
2004, some 2.5 million recipients used Aplitec's biometric 
smartcard at 7, 500 payout outlets to receive state pension 
and child support grants. Due to its unprecedented success, 
Aplitec installed smaller smartcard welfare schemes in six 
other African countries. Furthermore, Aplitec was the only 
IT company on the Johannesburg stock market whose share 
price rose during the three years that followed the 
collapse of the world IT bubble after March 2000 
(Breckenridge, 2005). Breckenridge also notes that given 
the high incidence of 'subsistence crime' in South Africa, 
it was remarkable that technicians responsible for delivery 
of these biometric systems in KwaZulu-Natal had never 
experienced an attempt at biometric impersonation. That is, 
they could not remember a particular instance where an 
individual attempted to withdraw cash from a payout using 
someone else's card. This, Breckenridge attests to the 
'disciplinary success of CPS's biometric pension scheme'. 
The former Chief Minister of KwaZulu and then national 
minister of Home Affairs, Mangosutho Buthelezi was so 
impressed with the fingerprint-identified pensions scheme 
that he first implemented that he resolved that a similar 
scheme would serve as the basis of a new national identity 
document. 
92 
Currently, CPS distributes social welfare 
grants on a monthly basis to over nine million 
beneficiaries in South Africa. These social welfare grants 
are distributed on behalf of South African Social Security 
Agency (SASSA) . The card has evolved over the years with 
the holder having access to all of the U.E.P.S. 
functionality, which includes the ability to have the smart 
card funded with pension or welfare payments, make retail 
purchases, enjoy the convenience of pre-paid facilities and 
qualify for a range of affordable financial services, 
including insurance and short-term loans as well as 
standard EMV transactional capabilities to operate wherever 
MasterCard is accepted ('Cash Paymaster Services', 2015). 
The smart card also offers the card holder the ability to 
make debit order payments to a variety of third parties, 
including utility companies, schools and retail merchants, 
with which the holder maintains an account. The card holder 
can also use the same smart card as a savings account. Thus 
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it performs basically the same functions as Ghana's e-zwich 
card except that in the latter, it is not used for the 
payment of pension and other welfare grants. 
However, while CPS, under the aegis of Netl 
UEPS manages the South African pension scheme, the e-zwich 
is purely managed by the Central Bank of Ghana's 
subsidiary, GhIPSS. In March 2012, the South African 
government engaged in a massive effort of citizen 
registration that continued for more than a year. Much more 
recently, nearly 19 million social welfare beneficiaries 
enrolled in a novel biometric identification scheme that 
uses fingerprints and voice recognition to authenticate 
social grant recipients (Donovan, 2013). However, the 
purpose of this paper does not incorporate this new 
biometric identification effort but rather dwells on that 
biometric technology that employed the use of fingerprints 
only. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS/DISCUSSIONS 
The E-zwich and Rogers' Characteristics of Innovation 
As Rogers argues, for any innovation to be 
adopted in a host country, it needs to offer some advantage 
that the existing innovation does not, must be compatible 
with existing values, past experiences, and needs of 
potential adopter, must be easy to understand and use and 
last but not least, it must be able to be tried or piloted 
for a number of times. But as the author contends, the 
'cost or the social motivation status' that the innovation 
provides relative to the existing one, is the most 
important factor that should influence the rate of 
adoption. The critical question here therefore is, did 
Ghana's e-zwich policy exhibit these features (without 
proffering any particular measurement) to warrant its 
adoption? 
Relative Advantage: With regard to relative 
advantage, the e-zwich system and for that matter, most 
biometric technologies bring with it certain advantages to 
a financial or banking system of any country. Prior to the 
e-zwich, there was no technology that performed the multi-
varied functions that the e-zwich affords to customers. The 
system performs three broad banking transactions-savings, 
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cash withdrawal and cash deposit, aside debit transactions. 
The e-zwich card currently has four wallets activated. 
These are; Primary, Savings, Transport and Secondary. Funds 
maintained in the savings wallet may attract interest based 
on the rate payable by the issuer bank. Interest is 
calculated daily by the switch and credited at the end of 
the month to the client card's host balance. A 10-digit 
code is then created for the card to load either manually 
on the POS using the code and amount (offline) or 
automatically through a communication network (Online) . 
Cash withdrawal involves the reduction of the electronic 
value stored on an e-zwich card in exchange for cash. This 
can be done by a bank Teller or at by a retail merchant. 
The process involves the verification of the cardholder and 
the update of the funds on a client's card by the e-zwich 
device (POS or ATM) . Cash withdrawal transactions are also 
offline transactions and do not require communications with 
a third party server. It can therefore be completed 
anywhere in the country. 
There is currently no limit to how much can be 
withdrawn from an e-zwich card except where the client has 
placed a limit during enrolment. For merchants, (bank 
Tellers and Retail) cash paid-out to e-zwich clients are 
credited to their bank accounts the day after settlement of 
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their POS devices. The e-zwich card can hold cash deposits 
for its cardholders in the same way that money can be 
deposited into bank accounts. The funds deposited on a card 
remains on it until it is used at a POS or e-zwich ATM. 
Cash deposits can be done from any e-zwich bank regardless 
of the bank that issued the client card. Thus a card issued 
at bank A can deposit funds at bank B. Keeping money on an 
e-zwich card is therefore the same as keeping it in a bank 
account. The added advantage of an e-zwich card is that 
when needed, the funds can be accessed from multiple 
institutions including other banks and retail merchants. 
There is also no limit to the amount of money 
that can be deposited on the card. There is also no fee 
charged for this transaction. Cash deposit is typically 
done by a bank Teller. Retail merchants can however add 
this to their sleuth of transactions as long as they 
allocate funds to be converted to e-money to through their 
banks. A retail merchant that performs cash deposit is 
referred to as a merchant agent. Money deposited on an e-
zwich card is protected by the biometric data 
(fingerprints) of the cardholder. The e-zwich card is also 
easy to obtain as it is issued for free by the banks as 
compared to ATM cards. Moreover, purchases or payments made 
by individuals using the e-zwich smartcard will not attract 
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any fees even though you will be charged a small fee for 
money transfers, cash withdrawals and some other 
transactions. However, as Agyeiwaa, Anane, Appiah, & Opoku-
Ware (2014) stated in their findings on the challenges with 
the e-zwich faced by both users and non-user customers of 
Ghana Commercial Bank, some respondents did not consider 
the affordability of e-zwich as a challenge as more than 
half of the respondents disagreed (70%) to this statement. 
Conversely, using VISA ATM cards issued by one bank on 
another bank's ATM attracts a charge ranging from 3 to 5 
cedis depending on the bank which is relatively costly. And 
so in this regard, the e-zwich system trumps the VISA ATM 
card in terms of affordability. 
Security-wise, the e-zwich card is deemed as 
highly secure as typical of smartcards. The most common 
method of securing e-payments is using cryptographic based 
technologies such as encryption and digital signatures 
(Taddesse & Kidan, 2005 in Kumaga, 2010) . Data stored on a 
smart card is encrypted and cannot be assessed without 
password/PIN and thus provide strong security. To this 
end, Taddesse & Kidan (2005) argue that magnetic strip 
cards i.e. debit cards, credit cards etc are being replaced 
by smart cards. Thus, the e-zwich card provides a greater 
form of security that 'existing' technology such as the 
VISA and MasterCard. 
On a more policy level, the e-zwich has aided 
in the eradication of some ghost names in the country's 
payroll system. Recently, the acting Executive Director of 
the National Service Scheme (NSS), Dr Michael Kpessa-Whyte, 
told the Daily Graphic in an exclusive interview that 
control measures activated by the new management of the 
Secretariat have prevented about 75,000 ghost names from 
entering the service payroll in the 2014/2015 service year 
("75,000 Ghost Names Removed From NSS Payroll; Saving 
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GH¢26.5m", 2015). Most importantly, the e-zwich card 
presents an opportunity for financial inclusion of the 
rural poor, thereby helping to transform the economy into a 
cashless economy. 
Compatibility: Compatibility is the extent to 
which an innovation is perceived as consistent with the 
existing values, past experiences, and needs of potential 
adopters. In the case of the e-zwich, it means that bank 
officials who would be responsible for the maintenance of 
the finger print readers in the ATMs and the merchants who 
would operate the POS must have the needed skills for 
success in their duties as well as the infrastructural base 
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to support this new technology. Breckenridge (2010) noted 
that within a month of the project's launch, only a 
'handful' of local banks had achieved the networking 
threshold required of them by the Central Bank. 
Furthermore, the installation of hole-in-the wall ATMs, a 
new feature, which according to Breckenridge (2010) had 
never formed part of Netl's infrastructure in South Africa, 
proved difficult and costly. Moreover, it was only in 
December, after the project was launched in April 2008 that 
the Britain-based De La Rue managed to deliver a handful of 
the machines. Breckenridge, further noted that the 
commercial banks in the country were more interested in 
providing ATMs for the local and foreign customers who 
wanted to use off shore EMV-compatible VISA cards than 
servicing the e-zwich account holders. Thus the financial 
interest in VISA cards far exceeded that of e-zwich 
smartcards even though the banks were mandated to roll out 
the project as soon as possible. 
Taddesse & Kidan, (2005) note that 
infrastructure is necessary for the successful 
implementation of electronic payments. Although, the e-
zwich system was hailed as being compatible with rural 
settings due to its offline feature, infrastructural issues 
hampered the use of e-zwich (Kumaga, 2010 and Agyeiwaa, 
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Anane, Appiah, & Opoku-Ware, 2014). For example, Agyeiwaa, 
Anane, Appiah, & Opoku-Ware (2014) indicated that 
statements like "ICT accessibility is a challenge for e-
zwich usage" recorded as much as 90.3% of agreement by 
respondents. With the country plagued with energy crisis 
for over three years now, respondent highlighted the 
severity of this problem with regard to the usage of the e-
zwich card; as many as 98.8% of the respondents agreed to 
this statement. Compatibility is not only assessed by the 
availability of electricity but also by telecommunication 
and the internet. Electronic payments communication 
infrastructure includes computer network such as the 
internet and mobile network used for mobile phone. In 
addition, banking activities and operations need to be 
automated. Mobile network and internet are readily 
available in the developed world and users usually do 
rarely have problems with communication infrastructure. 
This is however not the situation in Africa as mobile 
networks and internet are not easily accessible. 
"Poor communication infrastructure is one of 
the reasons that hinder the e-payment system in Africa" 
(Kumaga, 2010. See also Taddesse & Kidan, 2005). Kumaga 
noted that although e-zwich works offline, an online 
connection is needed for POS devices at the end of each day 
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to perform settlements. This is normally enabled and 
facilitated by any of the local mobile telecommunication 
companies. This connection is sometimes not successful 
thereby frustrating the users. The success of data transfer 
is dependent on bandwidth availability and signal strength 
in the area which is usually low in that part of the world. 
This is usually worst beyond the major cites of Accra and 
Kumasi, the two biggest towns in the country (Boateng, 
Tetteh and Boateng, 2015). The issue of infrastructure is 
evidenced when the German government provided 8 million 
euros as a soft loan for the development of the e-zwich 
infrastructure ("GhIPSS Secures 8 Million Euros German Soft 
Loan For E-Zwich Infrastructure", n.d.). In fact, Kwame 
Ansah, Head of Payment System at the Central Bank remarked: 
"Unfortunately, the e-zwich has not done well mainly 
because at the time that BoG was advertising and getting people to be 
interested in the system, the necessary infrastructure like the point 
of sale terminals (POSs) and ATMs had not been adequately put in 
place." ("Expert Explains E-zwich Glitch", 2012). 
Kumaga (2010) further stated that there are 
network connectivity problems when issuing new cards. 
Issuing e-zwich cards is an online activity hence requires 
connectivity which is sometimes an issue and depends on 
signal strength and bandwidth availability of the mobile 
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telecommunication company at the time of connection. 
GhIPSS, prior to the implementation of the system, 
anticipated that accessibility and usability through 
efficient operations of the telecommunication systems and 
managerial and operational issues as the number one 
challenge of the system. Yet, years after the 
implementation of the project, this problem still persists. 
Extending this definition, Ram (1987) states that 
'compatibility represents not only consistency with the 
existing values of the consumer, but also with traditional 
and cultural values, and with current lifestyles of the 
consumer'. Hence, as Breckenridge (2010) noted, some 
Ghanaians interpreted the e-zwich system as a sign of the 
biblical 'end-times'. This opposition is consistent with 
their religious beliefs, therefore forming a hesitant 
stance on the system. 
Complexity: Here, Rogers describe as "the 
degree to which an innovation is perceived as relatively 
difficult to understand and use" is an important obstacle 
to the adoption of an innovation. Ghana for so long is used 
to hearing that only 20% of its population is banked and 
with greater percentage of its population uneducated, it is 
quite straightforward to perceive the usability of the 
system by residents especially, those in the rural areas. 
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You would expect policy makers to anticipate that only few 
people would be able to perform transactions with the 
system, considering the self-use requirement for certain 
transactions such as money transfer. Kumaga (2010) offers 
some interesting findings based on his interview with some 
users of e-zwich. First, he observes that most users do not 
understand and appreciate the benefits of electronic 
banking to individuals and the society as a whole. He 
therefore argues that this has therefore made them hesitant 
and slow to adapt to 'new economic reality leading to poor 
patronage, lost opportunities and diminished 
competitiveness' in the financial sector. The few 
individuals who are willing to use electronic cards have 
difficulty in finding avenues to use electronic cards. They 
sometimes get frustrated and convert their money to cash in 
buying items instead of using their cards. Second, the few 
Ghanaians who 'understand' electronic transactions are 
still into traditional banking and cash transactions. As 
people form habit of doing one activity over and over 
again, they become comfortable with it, hence reducing 
their inclination to try out new things. Ram (1987) 
therefore contends that the vast majority of people who 
have no a priori desire to change may be more typical and 
even more rational than a small minority of individuals who 
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seek change for its own sake rather than or in addition to 
the intrinsic value of the innovations. In sum, Kumaga 
(2010) states that e-products are highly patronized by 
literates (which form a small percentage of the population 
relative to illiterates) since they have the requisite 
skill for its use. This problem, aside accessibility issues 
therefore undermines the motive of the Central bank to make 
those in the rural areas bankable. 
GhIPSS, the institution charged with managing 
the system, also acknowledged that lack of knowledge and 
skills in basic computing identified was a significant 
factor affecting electronic payment systems in Ghana 
(Boateng, Tetteh and Boateng, 2015). Not only lack of 
technical knowledge of how to use the system or card (basic 
computing), but lack of knowledge by individuals on the 
benefits and what the system provides is also a problem 
(Boateng, Tetteh & Boateng, 2015) . This affects both the 
merchants and the consumers alike. 
Trialability: The ability of an innovation to 
be tried on a small basis prior to its launch on a grand 
scale is also cited by Rogers (2003) as contributory to the 
rate of adoption of the innovation, and for the purposes of 
this study, to its success. The e-zwich was not at any 
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level or at any point in time implemented on a smaller 
scale before a national project was launched. Surprisingly 
however, none of the extant literature identified above 
mentions this problem as one of the reasons for the 
observed ineffectiveness of the system. Ram (1987) reasons 
that: 
If, for instance, a product based on an entirely new 
technology cannot be tried by the consumer prior to purchase, then the 
consumer is likely to perceive a high level of risk in purchasing the 
product. If on the other hand, the consumer has a successful trial with 
the product, the risk associated with the product is likely to 
decrease. 
Merchants were taught how to use the point-of-
sale devices through mass training program organized by the 
Central Bank in conjunction with the commercial banks, but 
only after the project had been launched. For the e-zwich 
card holder, no such training was available; the individual 
has to rely on his or her basic computing knowledge. Only 
when such individual faced difficulty is he compelled to 
seek help from a bank official, that is, if the ATM machine 
is on the premises of the bank. In locations where the 
machines where detached from banks, it means the individual 
cannot use his or her card. How to use the card was 
advertised on TV as well as individual banks providing 
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flyers for customers who pass through the banks, 
nevertheless, people struggled to comprehend the use of the 
cards. Ram (1987), further reasons that the concept of 
divisibility of innovation is related to trialability. 
Divisibility measures whether an innovation can be 
attempted in stages. The lower the trialability of an 
innovation, the higher the innovation of resistance. The 
lower the divisibility of an innovation, the higher the 
innovation resistance. By all means, the e-zwich system was 
not developed and implemented in phases. Commercial banks 
were hastily rushed into the implementation of the system 
with the Central Bank of Ghana instituting regulations to 
force them to abide by the rules. 
Observability: The degree to which the results 
of biometric payment systems elsewhere could be said to 
have been visible to Ghana especially that of South Africa 
who had been implementing biometric payment for a 
considerable number of years before the former decided to 
adopt the technology. Furthermore, besides South Africa, 
Netl UEPS had delivered payment system in Namibia and 
Botswana, hence, opportunities for drawing contrasting 
lessons from these countries were there. Moreover, it was a 
South-African company that had installed the technology in 
Ghana and as Breckenridge (2010) indicated, the e-zwich 
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system albeit sharing some features with the South African 
biometric payment system, had features that were an 
improvement over the latter. Therefore, ceteris paribus, 
the e-zwich system was supposed to achieve significant 
positive results based on policy learning. It is a fact 
that the-the KwaZulu biometric payment system had also 
faced certain challenges and positive results at its 
initial stages that Ghana's e-zwich could have learnt from; 
poor service delivery, specifically, long queues at pay 
points which was also identified by Antwi, Hamza, Bavoh 
(2015) as one of the problems facing the e-zwich system. In 
short, the e-zwich clearly satisfied this characteristic of 
innovation. 
South Africa's Biometric Payment System and the 
Characteristics of Innovation 
Relative Advantage: South Africa's biometric 
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system implemented in Kwazulu like the e-zwich system in 
Ghana, afforded the country some relative advantages. By 
virtue of it being the first country in Sub-Saharan Africa 
to adopt this technology, it is almost certain that the 
country was bound to enjoy certain benefits, especially 
with regard to the social status or prestige that the 
technology presents. South Africa therefore became the 
pioneer in the implementation of biometric technology and 
served as the point of reference especially for fellow 
countries in Southern Africa. As it turned out, Netl UEPS, 
a wholly-owned South African company, installed biometric 
technologies not only in neighboring Malawi, Botswana and 
Namibia, but in West African countries of Ghana and West 
Africa as well as in Iraq. The company is private-owned, 
nevertheless, it represents the country wherever it goes 
and for this reason, it could be said that it rubs on the 
status of the country. 
Most importantly, the biometric payment system 
was implemented in KwaZulu (also known as Zululand), a 
rural setting, hence, the system was able to include those 
beneficiaries into the financial sector. This was even more 
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so when Aplitec added other financial services like 
provision of short-term credit to grant holders in the 
system. This service has given millions of unbanked South 
Africans access to banking services and improved the 
banking culture of the rural population. Thus, 'they will 
now be able to utilize their smart cards as a fully 
operational bank account protected by their biometric 
profile' ('Smart(er) KZN pension cards', 2003). The 
biometric system was also implemented with the aim of 
reducing fraud and corruption in the distribution of the 
pension benefits. As Breckenridge (2014) stated, the 
adoption of the 'expensive' biometric payment system was 
downplayed by the 'elimination of invisible pilferage of 
millions of rands a year'. Thus while the system itself was 
expensive, the potential of it reducing fraud necessitated 
the adoption of the technology. 
Compatibility: With regard to compatibility (in 
technical terms), one of the intentions to adopt biometric 
technology was its ability to work in a limited 
infrastructural capacity especially inherent in rural 
areas. Relative to Ghana, however, the biometric system has 
been successful in this regard; "South Africa's approach 
provides a useful alternative for a sparse country with 
limited internet and cell network coverage" (Gelb, & 
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Decker, 2011). Much of the problem faced by the system has 
more to do with logistics than infrastructural issues, 
however, Breckenridge (2005) does not totally equate out 
this problem. For example, in responding to grant-holders 
waiting for many hours before receiving their benefits, 
Aplitec blamed it on the poor electronic record-keeping in 
the region of Kwazulu by government officials. Breckenridge 
also notes that the problem, to some extent, highlighted 
the conflict between private companies and elected 
officials in the dispensation of most state transactions. 
Thus, in South Africa, it appears that the 
problem of infrastructure and thus compatibility issues 
were at least, minimal. However, it has to be noted that 
the KwaZulu biometric payment system did not initially 
employ the use of biometric smartcards as was the case in 
Ghana, therefore explaining the relative less reliance on 
computing skills on the part of users. This was probably 
because, while in Ghana, a user basically conducts the 
transactions by him or herself (unless in retail 
transactions where all that the card-holder does is swipe 
his or her in the POS device), the biometric system in 
place in KwaZulu was taken to grant-holders (via four-wheel 
drive vehicles) and all that they have to do is press their 
forefinger onto a specially designed scanner attached to a 
computer. In Ghana, on the other hand, users have to know 
basic computing skills to be able to perform transaction 
with the biometrically-enabled ATMs. Thus, the South 
African system required less of computational skills than 
the e-zwich system, hence accessibility was greatly 
enhanced in the former. 
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Furthermore, Cash Payment System (CPS), the 
first company charged with the distribution installed 
fingerprint scanners in post off ices to channel payments to 
pensioners in the towns and cities also. And so as 
Breckenridge (2005) indicated, the biometric technology 
provided a 'compelling remedy to the provincial states 
administrative and infrastructural incapacity. It has to be 
noted that the KwaZulu system did not have multi-
functionality as was the case in Ghana, hence, explains 
users less reliance on basic computing skills. However, 
since 2003, KwaZulu-Natal pensioners have been using their 
smart cards to buy goods at certain stores where they can 
also draw cash (Vecchiatto, 2003). 
Complexity: Tied to accessibility is complexity 
or usability which is determined by the "degree to which an 
innovation is perceived as relatively difficult to 
understand and use". Like Ghana, the expected action of 
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policy makers would have been to not conceive the thought 
of employing this technology in view of the predominantly 
rural setting of the KwaZulu region. However, due to the 
simplicity of the technology, it was largely user-friendly; 
as indicated above, all that grant-holders had to do was 
press their thumbprint onto a scanner attached to a 
computer to receive payment. Even with the advent of 
additional services such as retail payment and cash 
withdrawal, transactions are facilitated by the merchants 
who only ask for the fingerprint of the users. In other 
words, "Beneficiaries will also be able to purchase goods 
and withdraw cash, in an offline environment, from the 
merchants participating in the payment system (Vecchiatto, 
2003). Thus, in South Africa, the issue of complexity is 
virtually nonexistent or less marked relative to the 
situation in Ghana. 
Trialability: Like the e-zwich system, the 
KwaZulu biometric payment was not tried on a smaller scale 
before it was launched on the regional level even though 
the system itself later on became the foundation for a 
national payment system. And so by Rogers (2003) reasoning, 
such innovation's ability to survive in the long run is 
highly limited. However, despite its inability to try the 
system on a smaller scale, it has fared better than the e-
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zwich. As of now, the e-zwich, since it was introduced into 
the country in 2008 has enrolled a little above 1 million 
but the volume of transactions of the card is dwindling, 
which has been so for the past three years ("E-Zwich 
Spending Swells", 2003). Presently, Netl Cash Payment 
Systems in South Africa on the other hand, distributes 
social welfare grants on a monthly basis to over nine 
million beneficiaries in South Africa ('Cash Paymaster 
Services', n.d.). In another report, Gelb (2012) indicated 
that the system was extended, across the entire country, in 
some cases with changes, and distributed grants to over 15 
million beneficiaries. After four years of negotiations to 
provide smartcards to pensioners, the KwaZulu-Natal 
government finally awarded the contract to Aplitec in 2004 
and in that same year, some 2.5 million recipients used the 
card at 7,500 payout points to receive state pension funds 
and child grants (Breckenridge, 2005). In Ghana, however, 
it was later in December (after the launch in April) that a 
'handful' of ATMs with fingerprints readers were installed 
(Breckenridge, 2010) and the number of enrollment was 
nowhere near that of the former. After a year of 
implementation, only "2,500 merchants had installed the 
biometric point-of-sale machines, and just over 300,000 
people had been issued with the cards" (Breckenridge, 
2010). 
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Observability: By being the first country to 
have deployed biometric payment technology on the African 
continent and in the world (Breckenridge, 2014) and indeed 
as the pioneer in biometrically-delivered direct cash 
transfer, the observability characteristic advocated by 
Rogers as necessary in influencing the adoption of an 
innovation was clearly nonexistent in the policy decision. 
There was little to virtually no results elsewhere to 
compare its biometric payment system to and learn from. 
This is compounded by the fact that no trials of the system 
were performed to assess its feasibility before it was 
wholly adopted. Thus, the biometric payment technology 
employed in South Africa was an original idea that was 
liable to high level of risk as compared to the situation 
in Ghana's e-zwich system. However, rather than drawing 
back the system, the 'success' of Netl system in South 
Africa is not in contention. As of 2008, 4 million people 
in South Africa were receiving state welfare or pension 
payments through the system ("Tackling The Security 
Challenge", 2008) and as indicated earlier, the number has 
risen significantly over the years. 
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The final section of the study assesses the 
effectiveness of the e-zwich system relative to South 
Africa's biometric payment system on one hand, and examines 
the applicability of Rogers' characteristics of innovation 
in the implementation of the biometric payment systems in 
the two countries on the other hand. The study then 
provides some suggestions as regards the way forward for 
the e-zwich system. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
The main aim of this study was two-fold; to 
assess the effectiveness of the e-zwich system in Ghana 
through Rogers' (2003) framework on the characteristics of 
innovation and in consequence, testing the validity of the 
framework. He contends that for any innovation to be 
successfully adopted in any country, it has to have exhibit 
his characteristics of innovation including relative 
advantages, compatibility, complexity, observability and 
trialability. The higher the evidence of these 
characteristics (with the exception of complexity which has 
an inverse relation with the rate of adoption) in the 
adopting country, the higher the likelihood of the 
innovation to be successful upon implementation. By this 
account, the study sought to find out whether the e-zwich 
system was adopted in Ghana because these characteristics 
were existing prior to implementation as well as existing 
currently. If they were, then ceteris paribus, this 
biometric payment system should demonstrate high success 
and an even greater potential in the future. Where the 
system is deemed or found to be highly ineffective, it is 
logical to conclude that the biometric payment technology 
or innovation adopted lacked Rogers' characteristics. 
Conversely, where most of the characteristics of 
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innovations were absent, yet the innovation has achieved 
relative success, it makes sense to say that Rogers' 
framework is not a sufficient condition for the adoption of 
innovation by a particular country and neither does it 
adequately predict the success of the innovation in the 
country. 
The e-zwich policy is still being touted as 
having immense potential after seven years of its 
implementation and the recent loan provided by the German 
government to help improve the technology of the system 
further raises some hope for the future success of the 
system. Furthermore, the e-zwich seems to have met Rogers' 
characteristics of innovation, especially with regard to 
the 'perceived' relative advantages that the system was 
supposed to bring. However, plenty challenges still abound. 
Definitely, any technology that is being considered by a 
state would be perceived to bring with it some advantages 
and Rogers' indicate that is the most important factor in 
influencing adoption decisions of decision-makers. However, 
it is not difficult to argue that the real problems in 
adopting an innovation especially with regard to the 
success of its implementation would depend on that 
particular environment in which it is being adopted. Issues 
of compatibility and complexity can be considered as more 
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crucial in this regard than the issue of relative 
advantages, especially in developing countries where the 
level of literacy in general and financial literacy for 
such financial innovation employed in both South Africa and 
Ghana could be vital to the success of that innovation. But 
the case of South Africa's biometric payment system seems 
to belittle these two characteristics of innovation as the 
technology has been relatively successful with major 
challenges of the system attributed to logistical problems 
such as inadequate and inaccurate data maintained by the 
local government in maintaining the records of the citizens 
(Breckenridge, 2005). This problem can easily be remedied 
but severe structural problems such as communication 
problems causing delays in the registration of potential 
subscribers of the e-zwich system as well as lack of 
understanding on the usage of the e-zwich card is a call 
for concern. 
As has been shown, the potential relative 
advantages and observability of the innovation were obvious 
prior to adoption. It was supposed to bring in the non-
illiterate population to the financial sector, facilitate 
transactions and interbank payments between the commercial 
banks and a host of other advantages that the technology 
could bring. What was particularly hailed about the system 
was its potential to reduce the problem of carrying large 
sums of cash around that created inconveniences (Asante, 
Boahene, Boakye, & Hagan, 2011). However, the success of 
the system has not gone down so well and this can be 
attributed to non-existent support systems in 
compatibility, complexity and to some extent trialability. 
Even though the system is designed to alleviate certain 
communication problems. 
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One worthy point to be noted in the success of 
South Africa's biometric payment is the role of the 
government in accelerating the patronage of the system. 
While the system is being managed by Cash Payment System 
(CPS) on behalf of the South-African government, the option 
of either signing up for the card or risk losing your 
social benefits has largely contributed in large numbers of 
beneficiaries being rolled up into the scheme. And so IMANI 
Ghana reckons that the problem with the e-zwich system is 
largely "strategic" rather than "technical" ( "IMANI Alert: 
E-Zwich Becoming a Colossal Waste of Resources?" 2010). On 
the basis of the scope of its ambition it was always 
expected that some technical difficulties would be 
encountered, and that these will be assuaged as time goes 
on and with increasing patronage. Even the most proven 
systems require a period of time to attain stability. 
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However, as the think-tank explains, right from the 
beginning, the policymakers and the managers of the e-zwich 
program made "systemic strategic mistakes that considerably 
weakened its prospects at the get-go". The biggest of these 
mistakes, it continues, was the failure to "separate the 
electronic switch and supporting gateways, the biometric 
identification backbone, and the consumer smartcard and POS 
terminal services from one another". IMANI reasons that: 
The electronic switch could have been the 
province of the Bank of Ghana, which could have also 
managed the biometric backbone on behalf of the public 
until the NIA (National Identification Authority) was ready 
to assume that function. A whole range of services could 
have then relied on the biometric backbone - NHIS (National 
Health Insurance Scheme), Electoral Commission, DVLA 
(Drivers & Vehicles Licensing Authority), Ghana Passport 
Office, and e-zwich itself. The result would have been a 
more efficient, a more ready-to-go, harmonized, and 
integrated national identification system, instead of the 
haphazard, fragmented, and frankly ridiculous system we 
have now, in which several agencies are falling over 
themselves to implement their own biometric databases, 
leading to great delays and outrageous cost overruns. 
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Another strategic problem is the prolonged 
inability of the Central Bank of Ghana initial promise that 
all public servants would have their monthly salaries paid 
onto their e-zwich cards. It is only recently that serious 
attempts have been made to actually implement this policy 
on a wide scale. This problem, according to Asante et al, 
2011 can be attributed to government's lack of commitment 
to this initiative since most of the implementation of the 
project has been left in the hands of GhIPSS. 
In their literature review, Asante, Boahene, 
Boakye & Hagan (2011) indicate that "implementation of 
electronic payment system is as a result of the behavior 
adopted by customers during transactions" And so Rogers' 
was right to state that one of the characteristics 
necessary for the successful adoption of innovations is 
complexity; that is, "how difficult it is for adopters to 
learn to use an innovation" (Yocco, 2015) . E-zwich 
transactions have truly validated Cobb's assertion, but on 
a negative note as citizens on many occasions have 
struggled to get their fingerprints read by the POS 
machines and sometimes being turned away by merchants when 
machine indicated that they were not the rightful owners of 
the e-zwich cards. Years after the implementation of the 
policy, some individuals still experience this difficulty. 
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Thus it is evident that the seemingly coercive 
strategy adopted by the South-African government as 
compared to the soft-stance (on citizens especially) of the 
Government of Ghana over the years has largely been 
instrumental in rolling more individuals into its biometric 
payment system. Ironically however, the role of the 
privately-run CPS can be hardly disputed to have 
contributed in boosting the effective running of the 
system. Does the success of the South Africa's system which 
is managed by a private-firm serve as useful lesson to 
Ghana to award the management of the e-zwich system to 
(which is controlled by the Bank of Ghana through GhIPSS) 
to a tried and tested private-firm like CPS? IMANI for 
example believes that the consumer smartcard part of the e-
zwich program, which is represented by the smartcards 
themselves and the point of sales terminals, should 
definitely have been left in the hands of the many private-
sector developers of electronic payment solutions already 
working in Ghana. The competition would have mitigated 
disastrous decisions such as were taken by GhIPPS at the 
start of the initiative to require merchants to purchase 
the terminals. This seriously slowed adoption and 
attenuated the initial drive of the program. This it 
contends was a huge marketing mistake as money was thrown 
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into adverts and yet potential customers could not see the 
terminals anywhere. In a society with predominantly 
impulse-driven market behavior it is quite difficult to 
ascertain the effect of advertising on consumer choices. 
Although observability was evident in the 
innovation of the e-zwich system by virtue of the country 
having an advantage from the opportunity in learning from 
the results of the KwaZulu payment system, this did not and 
has still not helped in the implementation of the system. 
This reinforces the above point that perhaps in the case of 
the e-zwich system, the problem has to do more with 
strategic decisions made by officials at the Central Bank 
as well as GhIPSS rather than technicalities such as 
compatibility and complexity issues that Rogers state as 
important in the adoption process. Rogers does not address 
the importance of the ability of the innovation to be 
divided into smaller phases or stages during the trial 
process. Ram (1987) filled this gap by stating that the 
more an innovation is tried in smaller doses prior to full-
scale implementation, the better for the innovation to 
succeed in the long run. According to the Central Bank of 
Ghana, the e-zwich program was supposed to be carried out 
in three stages; the first phase included the installation 
of the switch host, establishment of networks and issuing 
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of biometric smartcards by banks to clients as well as 
deployment of POS terminals by banks at specific acquired 
merchants and in bank branches (Asante et al, 2011). This 
phase, according to the Central Bank was completed and led 
to the launch of the e-zwich system on April 28, 2008. 
Phases two and three are unfortunately yet to 
be materialized and the future of them coming into fruition 
is quite bleak to say the least. According to the Bank's 
2008 annual report, phase two involved the introduction of 
new ATMs into the system and modifying existing ones to 
accept both biometric smartcards and Personal 
Identification Numbers (PIN) based magnetic stripe cards 
and the inclusion of mobile banking onto the switch (Asante 
et al). But this phase has not been fully incorporated as 
planned. ATMs are located in few designated places 
throughout the country. In some places such as Western, 
Central, Upper West and Upper East regions there is ATM in 
only one location. Interestingly, these regions, especially 
the last two, represent the two most rural areas in the 
country. This reality therefore questions the real 
intention of policymakers to make the e-zwich system a 
means for financial inclusion of people in these regions. 
The last phase of the program was to incorporate e-zwich 
with the card systems of major international card 
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associations such as VISA and MasterCard so that these 
different cards can be accepted at the same payment outlets 
in Ghana (Asante et al, 2011). This phase has been 
implemented but with mixed results. The Gh-Link Point of 
Sale, which was introduced four years in 2012, after the 
launch of the program ("GhIPPS Introduces GH-Link Card", 
2012) accepts both e-zwich and ATM cards for payment but 
only available at selected shops and supermarkets, about 
eighteen in total. This paltry amount of these POS also 
limits access to the system and undoubtedly defeats the 
financial inclusion of rural folks as the Gh-Link POS is in 
place at large urban centers than in rural areas. It is 
therefore little wonder that the greater chunk of e-zwich 
card issues made so far, the distribution is overwhelmingly 
urban and peri-urban. And so the e-zwich appears to have 
been implemented in phases, but the haphazard nature of its 
implementation provides allows room to suggest that it was 
rarely carried out in stages or to reason that it was 
'planned' to be but not actually implemented as such. 
Besides, Ram's argument has to do with divisibility at the 
trial stage but not after the broad-scale launch of the 
program. Thus even if we agree that the e-zwich was 
implemented in stages, it was not undertaken during any 
try-out process of the program. 
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Furthermore, by virtue of its ad hoc 
implementation, it can also be argued that the 
implementation of the various phases was necessitated by 
lack of adequate resources to make the program fully 
operational, rather than a conscious attempt to do so. This 
perhaps explains why even though GhIPPS purchased a 
whopping 3 million of the biometric smartcards in advance 
they were only able to issue out a paltry 10% as of 2012, 
four years after the launch of the system ("IMANI Alert: E-
Zwich Becoming A Colossal Waste of Resources", 2012.). This 
led NET 1, in various calls with analysts and in regulatory 
announcements to create the impression that there was a 
deliberate slowdown in card issuance by the Ghanaian 
authorities in order to allow infrastructure to catch up 
with mass marketing drive by authorities to accelerate the 
adoption of e-zwich cards. Seven years down the line, 
authorities are still trying to boost the needed 
infrastructure to support the system as evident in the 
recent loan promised to GhIPSS by the German government to 
help in this effort. 
So from all indications, the e-zwich system has 
fallen short of its expectations when gauged against 
Rogers' characteristics of innovation. The expectations lie 
in its relative advantages, but the success and 
sustainability of the program lie in its compatibility 
(infrastructural and cultural support) and complexity 
(access and usage) and these two have not helped in this 
regard. The KwaZulu biometric payment on the other hand, 
has not only survived, but has increased its number of 
enrollment and usage since its implementation in 1999 and 
there are no signs of slowing down. Albeit the system 
lacked in key prerequisites of innovation adoption per 
Rogers' postulate, it has achieved success that would have 
been expected of an innovation that was new to the country 
and continent at large. The KwaZulu system lacked clearly 
in observability, trialability and to some extent 
compatibility (logistical problems). However, the ease and 
usage (complexity) of the system, although some challenges 
were noted, (long waiting times for trucks carrying the 
system) did not hinder its adoption in neighboring 
provinces and the system has indeed gone national. 
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Does the success of the South African system 
therefore offer credence to Rogers' assertion that the most 
important characteristic among the other characteristics of 
innovation is relative advantages that the innovation 
brings? Yes and no. Yes because the inadequacies of an 
existing innovation in the face of new or increased demands 
lead to calls for an improved innovation or system 
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especially where there is clear evidence of the positive 
outcomes of an alternative system elsewhere. In the 1980s 
and early '90s, computer word-processing programs WordStar 
and WordPerfect demonstrated relative advantage over 
existing products. And even before the advent of computers 
in that era, most offices relied on typewriters, which took 
up a lot of space, performed only one function and required 
servicing, supplies (type ribbons, whiteout, etc.) and 
parts on a regular basis (they were also pretty loud) . As 
computers became more prevalent, WordStar and WordPerfect 
freed users from typewriters. The relative advantage was 
thus obvious. 
The word-processing programs did not require 
any additional physical space other than the personal 
computer, which already performed a number of other office 
tasks such as reducing the need for ink and correction 
tape; documents could be easily edited prior to printing; 
and files could be saved and transported for editing on 
other computers using floppy disks. Soon, typewriters were 
being phased out of off ices and replaced with these 
computer word-processing programs. Therefore, as long as 
the problems of an existing innovation persist, 
policymakers would make several necessary attempts to get 
rid of it even if it is going to take extreme costs and a 
129 
long period of time because, they perceive the alternative 
to be worth it in light of its advantages that it is 
expected to bring once it has been fully incorporated into 
the system. 
However, how much cost and how long such 
eventual realization of the new system can be born depends 
on the adopting environment or policy home. The prolonged 
experimentation of the new alternative can come at extreme 
opportunity cost that could mean abandoning certain vital 
policies in the short run whose consequences can be far-
reaching into the future. Should an impoverished country 
focus all of its resources on a given technology at the 
expense of meeting a more immediate need such as the 
provision of necessities as rural water and electricity, 
food and shelter? In developing countries such as Ghana, 
the need for an advanced technology may not be necessary 
now in view of its gross illiteracy rate. It is hard to 
argue that making desperate attempts to bring the rural 
folk into the financial system is more important than 
making sure that they assured of three meals per day or 
that they are not living on less than a dollar day. 
As indicated already, these individuals do not 
have the education necessary to comprehend the modus 
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operandi of the e-zwich system. Furthermore, most rural 
homes do not even have televisions and radio sets to listen 
to any commercials about the program due to the fact that 
they do not have electricity at their homes. This 
unfavorable environment perhaps explains why as of 2012, 
estimates suggested that monthly transactions (a more 
useful measure) never exceeded 10,000 as compared to the 
success of a private consumer smartcard company in post-
communist Hungary, GBC, which having launched in an 
environment only "mildly" favorable than Ghana's, managed 
to deploy 17,000 POSs and process 8 million transactions 
per month during the first phase of their operational 
strategy ("IMANI Alert: E-Zwich Becoming A Colossal Waste 
of Resources?", 2012). 
The success of South Africa's system therefore 
appears to have buttressed Rogers' argument that relative 
advantage is the most important characteristic of 
innovation, if it is argued that by clearly anticipating 
the positive outcomes of an alternative innovation, 
authorities are more than willing to see its success even 
in the face of challenges. On the other hand, the relative 
lack of environmental support for Ghana's e-zwich system 
seems to undermine Rogers' theory. The relative 'failure' 
(to be generous) of the e-zwich system, per its primary aim 
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of financial inclusion raises three questions. First, does 
the failure of the e-zwich system relative to the success 
of the South Africa system imply that the success of the 
adoption of biometric payment system depends on the 'type' 
of service for which the technology is deployed? Second, 
was the primary aim of the e-zwich system wrong in the 
first place? And third, should the e-zwich system be run by 
a private firm? 
For the first question, the answer would be in 
the affirmative as judged by the deployment of biometric 
payment technology in social welfare schemes of both South 
Africa and India. Much has already been discussed about 
South Africa's system whereby enrollment has increased to 
over nine million. An even more remarkable feat has been 
achieved with the biometric payment system (Smartcard 
program) in Andrah Prakesh (AP), India. The Government of 
Andrah Prakesh (AoAP), which deployed the technology to two 
welfare schemes: the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Schem (MGNREGS) and the state-sponsored social 
security pension (SSP) program, has been able to "overcome 
sizeable operational barriers to initiate payments in 
approximately 76 % (NREGS) and 82% (SSP) of study district 
gram panchayats (GPs) as of March 2012" (Mukhopadhyay, 
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Muralidharan, Niehaus & Sukhtankar, 2013). As was the 
situation in South Africa, this "impressive success" would 
not have taken place had it not been the role of government 
functionaries. Mukhopadhyay et al (2013), note that a "key 
enabling factor has been the commitment of top-ranking 
government officials to develop, monitor, and improve the 
Smartcard program on an on-going basis". And so it is 
evident that the compelling nature of the social welfare 
schemes in place in both South Africa has contributed to 
the success of the payment systems. The extent of the 
success with Andrah Pradesh's biometric payment is so 
remarkable that "over 90% of beneficiaries report that they 
pref er the biometric payment system to the previous system 
of having to travel to the post off ice to collect payments" 
(Mukhopadhyay et al, 2013). 
The second question, the study recommends the 
expert advice of IMANI. The reputable think-tank, based on 
their analysis suggests that the aim of e-zwich should have 
been "branchless banking" instead of "financial inclusion". 
It contends that even though authorities assert that 20% of 
the population is unbanked, this statistic can be 
misleading, in that, the figure does not commensurate with 
the more critical indicator: funds outside the banking 
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system, which the Bank of Ghana closely monitors. Per their 
argument, the currency ratio indices have consistently 
shown that the bulk of Ghana's money still passes through 
the banks. Therefore, the middle and upper classes control 
the country's wealth and they are generally well-banked. 
Thus the real challenge of the e-zwich system per this 
objective is that, do poor, illiterate, rural dwellers have 
cash hoarded up that can be "deposit-mobilized" into the 
banking system? IMANI's analysis suggests that this is not 
the case. 
The answer to the issue of whether the e-zwich 
system should be privatized or not can also be found in the 
successful implementation of the social welfare schemes in 
both South Africa and India. Although the state apparatus 
has been crucial in the success of the biometric payments 
systems in both countries, the role of the private-sector 
cannot be downplayed. As indicated earlier, South Africa's 
system is managed by Net l's Cash Payment System and most 
of the company's national switch and smartcard 
implementations in other African countries had been on 
joint venture basis with the government, and card issuance 
per capita appears to have been more successful in many of 
these places ("IMANI Alert: E-Zwich Becoming A Colossal 
Waste of Resources?", 2012). The same situation prevails in 
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NET l's Latin American operations too. In India, The AP 
Smartcard program has been implemented through a bank-led, 
business correspondent (BC) approach, within the structure 
of "one-district-one-bank" model (however, in three 
districts, the Post Office has been contracted by the GoAP 
to issue biometric payments) . The payment delivery system 
relies upon customer service providers (CSPs) to transact 
last-mile payments at the behest of contracted banks, using 
POS devices for authentication. The success of the systems 
in place in the above countries therefore questions the 
decision taken by the Bank of Ghana to be the sole owner 
and sole carrier of risks in Ghana's case. 
To reinstate, the Andrah Prakesh case shows 
governmental actors' role in the successful delivery of 
biometric technology. And so Muller (2010), states that the 
potential adoption of biometric ID cards tend to boost 
"dominant contemporary discourse and logics of rule and 
governance and generally focus on issues associated with 
the implementation of biometric ID cards". Therefore he 
explains that in Canada, the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Ontario and Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada (CIC) are regularly involved in the evaluation of 
biometric technologies, biometric encryption and the 
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relationship between security and privacy and the role that 
biometrics can influence that relationship. Furthermore, 
after adoption of the biometric technology, the lack of any 
trade organization-based regulatory mechanism may 
ultimately result in more "draconian" governmental 
restrictions if consumer harm is enough (Langenderfer & 
Linnhoff, 2005). If governments are influential in the 
adoption of biometric technologies then it reasons that 
government workers' attitude to these new technology is key 
to ensuring successful adoption. 
Thus it can be investigated whether workers at 
GhIPSS have had a lukewarm attitude towards the e-zwich 
system which may be contributing to the relative 
ineffectiveness of the system. An exploratory study of 
government employees' perceptions of the introduction of 
biometrics at the workplace in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
indicated that a significant digital and cultural gap 
between the technological awareness of employees and the 
preferred authentication solutions promoted by management 
(Alhussain, & Drew, 2009). A lack of trust in technology, 
its potential for misuse and public management motives 
reflect public managers' need to consider their 
responsibilities for narrowing these gaps. In view of this 
it is evident that overcoming public workers' resistance, 
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especially those who have a direct impact, is an essential 
issue facing biometric implementation. And so in Andrah 
Pradesh, Mukhopadhyay et al, 2013 underscores the critical 
role of government employees in the state's implementation 
of the biometric payment system: 
In general, the high degree of engagement 
maintained by top government officials has had the 
following important implications: 1) it has signalled to 
major stake-holders that GoAP considers the Smartcard 
program to be a priority, 2) it has allowed GoAP to develop 
relationships with the main agents of implementation, the 
banks and TSPs, and 3) it has helped to establish a regular 
discourse on how to resolve programmatic and operational 
challenges. 
Therefore where government actors lack the 
right attitude to ensure the implementation of biometric 
technologies it is perhaps necessary to establish and 
enforce a legal framework to support it. However, in the 
developing countries including Ghana and South Africa, the 
adoption of new technologies is rarely preceded by the 
adoption and implementation of robust regulatory 
frameworksl. In Ghana, the government's role in the 
implementation of the e-zwich at the early stages was the 
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coercion of private banks to adopt the system through 
directives by the Central Bank of Ghana, but these 
directives had no legal basis. That is, no law was 
specifically created to help back the implementation of the 
system, except those existing laws that gave the Central 
Bank the power to initiate policies based on its 
discretion. 
However, the Ghana Interbank Payment and 
Settlement Systems Limited (GhIPSS) , a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the Bank of Ghana, was incorporated in May 
2007 (a year before the launch of e-zwich) with a mandate 
to implement and manage interoperable payment system 
infrastructures for banks and non-bank financial 
institutions in Ghana. In a more proactive role, the 
government has recently stepped up its effort to enroll 
public sectors workers in the system. The Controller and 
Accountant- General Department is expected to commence the 
payment of all civil servants by a biometric E-zwich 
platform in 2015. This follows an on-going pilot program to 
gradually ensure public sector workers are paid via the E-
zwich payment system2. The roll out plan was initially to 
start with the finance department of the Controller and 
Accountant Department, then to all staff members in Accra. 
This follows the payment of all National Service personnel 
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on their e-zwich cards, which began much earlier in 
December last year. The department therefore hopes to learn 
the experiences of the latter to inform how to proceed with 
its objective. 
Also, the government, in financing the Ghana 
School Feeding Program, has started paying caterers through 
e-zwich. President Mahama made the promise in 2014 and a 
little less than a year after that promise, the school 
feeding caterers are being paid electronically using the e-
zwich biometric smart card as well as mobile money 
platforms ("Paying School Feeding Caterers On E-Zwich 
Begins", 2015). The government also secures loan for the 
improvement of the system. In 2011, despite the opposition 
from the Minority caucus, parliament approved 70 million 
Euro loan facility that is meant to finance the e-zwich 
rural branchless banking ("Parliament Approves 70 Million 
Euros For E-Zwich Project", 2011). This is where the role 
of the Ghana government stops; it seeks to encourage 
patronage of the system by enrolling more public workers 
onto the scheme as well as seeking funds for the 
improvement of the system. Thus the GhIPSS by being a 
subsidiary of the Bank of Ghana which is solely owned by 
the state, receives substantial support from the government 
and its initiatives are therefore expected to be in line 
with those of the government or at least, needs 
governmental approval before implementation. 
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In South Africa while the distribution of the 
grants is solely the responsibility of the private firm 
Cash Payment Services (CPS), the social grant system is 
wholly administered by the South African Social Security 
Agency (SASSA) . Even though the leadership team includes 
some cabinet ministers (Minister and Deputy Minister of 
Social Development), its standing as an independent agency 
rather than a government department means it has a number 
of discretionary powers. This gives it greater flexibility 
in addressing the problem of acute skill shortages that so 
bedevils government departments. That is, government's role 
in the country's biometric payment is relatively minimal, 
but this does not prevent it from intervening in the scheme 
when it deems necessary. Even before the KwaZulu biometric 
payment was transformed into a national social grant 
scheme, there was some interference from members of the 
national government. For instance, in response to grant-
holders in Eastern Cape having died while waiting for 
payment and other complaints by beneficiaries of having to 
wait for hours for CPS trucks to arrive, Minister of 
Welfare, Zola Skweyiya, denounced the CPS contract. He 
accused the company of 'gross and flagrant violations' of 
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the terms of the contract and the 'human and constitutional 
rights of our people', he called for an end to the contract 
(Breckinridge, 2005). Recently, the company has faced 
significant criticisms especially with the Black Sash and 
its partners collecting documentation from thousands of 
grant recipients about deductions being made without their 
permission against their accounts ("Netl - The Company That 
Runs The Social Grant Payment System"). In consequence to 
these complaints, the Minister of Social Development, 
Bathabile Dlamini, set up a task team to examine the issue 
and in September last year announced, among other things: 
that Sassa and her department would ensure that CPS 
complied with all relevant legislation; -that payment systems would be 
designed in such a manner that social grant beneficiaries' bank 
accounts are off limits to creditors; and -that all debit deductions 
for Umoya Manje services (a Netl subsidiary that facilitates purchasing 
of cellphone time on credit), loans and any other financial service 
providers other than legal deductions would be reversed. 
Thus while both SASSA and CPS have a high 
degree of independence to execute its mandates, the 
interest of the public is paramount, hence, the government 
will step in to ensure that any problems associated with 
the biometric payment system are resolved. Besides, as long 
as SASSA remains a state institution, government 
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interference in its operations are inevitable even if it 
means the government overstepping its boundaries especially 
when it is funding the operations of the system. Thus 
although it may seem the government is breaching the law by 
interfering, it can be seen as 'moral' not only to SASSA, 
but also to the many beneficiaries of the scheme. 
Just as government and its officials are 
important in the successful delivery of biometric payment 
systems, it is equally important for relevant stakeholders 
in the private sector to show commitment to the innovation. 
The financial institutions in Ghana did not demonstrate 
gross resentment towards the e-zwich system (at least in 
the public eye), however, their support was lukewarm. This 
is because of the overall "policed monopoly" of the Central 
Bank in the implementation of the system, even though there 
was some level of collaboration with the banks. Commercial 
banks were more interested in serving their customers who 
demanded international debit cards such as VISA and 
MasterCard at the expense of the e-zwich cards. Even though 
they were generally interested in the new system, their 
actions showed otherwise and this adversely affected wide 
scale enrollment of customers onto the scheme. In short, it 
is not enough for an innovation to exhibit Rogers' relative 
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advantages, more has to be done to bring relevant actors in 
the implementation of the innovation. 
Therefore, is there any indication that Ghana's 
e-zwich is bound to start realizing significant benefits 
anytime soon? It is justified to believe that without 
urgent reform, e-zwich would end up as a colossal white 
elephant. This does not have to be the case, since as per 
the analysis above, e-zwich can become a productive 
national asset if managed well. Like human beings, policies 
are not an 'island'; they need the right incentives and 
support systems to become and remain successful. 
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